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HAND OVER FIST: THE FAILURE OF 
STOIC RHETORIC 
Students of Stoic philosophy, especially of Stoic ethics, have a lot to swallow. Virtues 
and emotions are bodies; virtue is the only good, and constitutes happiness, while vice 
is the only evil; emotions are judgements (in Chrysippus' Stoa); all sins are equal; and 
everyone bar the sage is mad, bad and dangerous to know. Non-Stoics in antiquity 
seem for the most part to find these doctrines as bizarre as we do. Their own 
philosophical or ideological perspectives, and the criticisms of the Stoa to which these 
gave rise, are no less open to criticism than are the paradoxes and puzzles under 
attack - but they may be, often are, better documented, less provocatively attention- 
begging, or simply more familiar. Even disputes within the Stoa can be obscured or 
distorted by modern prejudices. Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' theory of a unitary 
soul, one rational through and through, on the grounds that such a theory could not 
satisfactorily account for the genesis of bad - excessive and irrational - emotions, the 
rda'-q (Galen, PHP 2.246.36ff., 314.15ff. De Lacy).' Posidonius' own Platonising, 
tripartite soul feels more familiar to us because the Republic tends to be a set text 
rather more often than do the fragments of Chrysippus' de anima; and the balance 
in Plato's favour is unlikely to change. When Posidonius wrote, on the other hand, the 
Chrysippean soul was school orthodoxy, and Platonism the latest thing in radical chic. 
There was one division of Stoic philosophical doctrine in which the best part of the 
educated Hellenistic and Roman world had the advantage of familiarity to lend 
support to its contempt, one which we rarely touch, and would hardly think of as part 
of philosophy at all: rhetoric. If ancient philosophers do turn in that direction, it is 
philosophy's quarrel with rhetoric which is most likely to take their fancy. Yet 
rhetoric provided what might be called the standard higher education in the ancient 
world, for those who could afford it, from about the 4th century B.C.2 Whole areas 
of ancient rhetorical teaching (what types of oration there are, what should go into 
each of the different parts of a forensic speech, theories of style3 and of types of 
1 The idea that emotions are judgements may at first glance seem less surprising to a modern 
than to an ancient philosopher: but crucial issues in Chrysippus' moral psychology - his 
conception of reason, his grounds for justifying moral responsibility, his reasons for believing 
the extirpation of the passions to be a good thing - are inescapably Stoic. 
2 The standard histories are: H.-I. Marrou, Histoire de I'Education dans I'Antiquite (Paris, 
1950, tr. G. Lamb, London, 1956); D. L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (N. Y., 
1957); M. L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World (London, 1971), pp. 28ff.; S. F. 
Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome (London, 1977). General treatments of rhetoric in antiquity 
include: R. Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und R6mer (Leipzig, 1885, 2nd ed.); M. L. 
Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome (London, 1953), esp. chs. 1, 3; E. Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa (5th 
ed., Stuttgart, 1958); A. D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio (Amsterdam, 1963); G. A. Kennedy, The 
Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton/London, 1963); id., The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman 
World (Princeton, 1972); J. Martin, Die antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode (Munich, 
1974). ' Style has been by far the most long-lived of all these rhetorical topics, of course. What 
distinguishes the rhetorical handling of style, however, are its continuing associations with 
persuasion and with the formal, institutionalised contexts in which it was displayed, associations 
which remained part of the method of teaching composition even beyond the end of antiquity. 
On the later history of rhetoric, see G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and 
Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (London, 1980). 
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stasis,4 the best way of handling evidence extracted under torture, what to do with 
one's hands when declaiming, and many other topics thrashed out or limply fondled 
by Aristotle, Hermagoras, Cicero, Quintilian, and their epigones) now seem as 
strange to us as Stoic stylistics, which will be the central concern of this paper, seemed 
to the ancient rhetorical establishment. In a number of ways Stoic rhetorical 
teaching was, as we will see later, barely distinguishable from its professional 
counterparts. Style - an area in which the Stoa reputedly achieved almost unqualified 
failure- was not one of them. But it is very difficult to appreciate today how 
unorthodox Stoic pronouncements on style once seemed to professional orators and 
rhetoricians precisely because we have no personal experience of the traditional 
rhetorical precepts challenged by the Stoics, while there are mere references to a tiny 
handful of major orators, all Roman, who actually 'spoke Stoic'. This dearth of 
evidence - familiar enough to historians of the Stoa - happily turns out far less an 
obstacle to reconstructing at least the broad outlines of Stoic rhetorical style than 
might at first be feared. 
A brief sketch of conventional teaching on style in the rhetorical schools may be 
helpful.5 Style (MXAL, ,opdals, elocutio, dictio) traditionally constitutes one of the five 
areas of oratorical expertise. (The others are: 
E3pEc•Lt, 
inventio, finding out what is to 
be said; -rda's, ordo, arranging such material; memory; and delivery.) Different 
qualities of style are determined by choice of vocabulary, by the structure and rhythm 
of sentences and of their parts and groupings, and by the use of the standard 
ornaments described in all later textbooks, figures and tropes. The theoretical 
framework employed for critical and didactic purposes alike (and the normative, 
paedagogic slant of much of ancient stylistics can hardly be overlooked) had, 
roughly speaking, two main props, the 'virtues and vices' (dpEral Ka' KaK Lat) of style, 
and the 'types' or 'characters' of style (the xapaKTr~pEs 70ro Adyov or genera dicendi), 
though the two tended to merge with time.6 The origin and development of the genera 
dicendi are complex and problematic,7 but, revealingly, the fundamental assumption 
on which this mode of classification rests - that different audiences, different 
speakers, in short different circumstances, demand not only different objects but also 
different (because all equally appropriate) styles of discourse - appears to have no 
place in Stoic stylistics. 
Another approach, though one often complementary to the first, was for the critic 
to isolate what he saw as the excellences and defects of an author's style, and for the 
4 The stasis (or status) of a case, roughly speaking, is the 'issue' on which it turns, the point 
which if decided will determine the outcome of the whole case. Defining stasis and isolating its 
intricate subdivisions are major topics in the handbooks. Quintilian 3.6 is the clearest ancient 
treatment of this tricky subject. See also R. Volkmann (cited n. 2), pp. 38-92; S. F. Bonner, 
Education (cited n. 2), pp. 296ff.; D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge, 1983), ch. 3. 
5 Useful introductions to the teaching of style in antiquity can be found in all the texts cited 
in n. 2.; see also D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (London, 1981), esp. chs. 8, 9. 
6 See Russell, op. cit. n. 5, pp. 136ff., on this tendency. 
The chief bones of contention have been: Theophrastus' contribution to this area of stylistic 
theory, and the origins and ramifications of its commonest variant, the doctrine of the 'three 
styles' (viz. the grand, the plain, and the smooth or middle style), which was itself hotly debated; 
e.g. ad Her. 4.11 ff.; Cicero, de or. 3.199, cf. 210ff., where different styles are discussed under the 
rubric of the virtue of appropriateness, and associated with different sorts of discourse; orator 
20ff.; Quintilian 12.10.58ff.). Especially useful modern studies are: G. A. Kennedy, The Art of 
Persuasion (cited n. 2), pp. 278ff.; Russell, Criticism (cited n. 5), ch. 9; D. Innes, 'Theophrastus 
and the Theory of Style', in Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Works, ed. W. W. 
Fortenbaugh (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 2, 1985), at 251ff., esp. 
260ff. 
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teacher to attempt to inculcate in his pupils whatever 'virtues' were considered 
appropriate to, say, different divisions of a speech, or to the different sorts of oration 
(forensic, deliberative, and epideictic/encomiastic/panegyric), and to eliminate the 
associated 'vices'. For example, the narrative of a forensic speech, in which a speaker 
presents his version of the events surrounding the case, had conventionally to be clear, 
concise and plausible (so for example Quintilian, inst. orat. 4.2.31; Cicero, orator 122, 
part. orat. 32, where suavitas is added). The standard list of virtues comprises: purity 
(Hellenism or Latinity), clarity, appropriateness, and ornament (e.g. ad Her. 4.17ff.; 
Cicero, de or. 3.37ff.; Quintilian 8.1.1ff.), but others are invoked as required: so with 
brevity and plausibility in the case of narrative. The notion of an (or the) apET~r of 
discourse makes it first known appearance in Aristotle's Rhetoric (3.2.1404blff.). His 
unitary conception seems to have been analysed by Theophrastus into what became 
the four standard dpErat', which were appropriated, and often expanded or adapted, 
by just about all later writers on style, including, probably, the Stoics. But in the use 
it made of the dpE-al 0oi• Adyov 
the early Stoa, as we will see, overlooked or rejected 
other, related Peripatetic stylistic precepts, as well as contemporary professional 
orthodoxy, and appears to have reverted in part to an even earlier model of rhetorical 
discourse. 
In two of the three traditional branches of rhetoric, the forensic or judicial and the 
deliberative, the orator did not exercise his stylistic abilities purely for the delight of 
his audience: only the third, epideictic, was principally directed, as Quintilian remarks, 
'ad popularem...delectationem' 2.10.11; cf. 8.3.11-14, and Cicero, orator 65, 'nec 
tam persuadere quam delectare')." The aesthetic appeal of a speaker's language 
served only to further his chief purpose: to persuade them to a particular end (an 
acquittal or a guilty verdict, or the adoption of whatever course of action or way of 
thinking was advocated by the speaker). 'Those well-worn precepts, common to all' 
which Crassus learned in his youth, declare 'the orator's first task to be to speak in 
a way that is suited to persuade' (de or. 1.137-8). The traditional orator's goal, 
persuasion, dominates a wide variety of definitions of the function (Epyov, officium) 
or end 
(r•'AoS, 
finis) of oratory or the orator: from Plato's 'manufacturer of 
persuasion' (Gorgias 453a), through Aristotle's 'the power of discovering in each case 
all possible material of persuasion' (Rh. 1.2.1355b25-6), Hermagoras' 'treating the 
proposed political question as persuasively as possible' (7(- r 7oElv roKAt-tv 
7-r7rra $taroL'OEaat Kar& -r EVStEXdtOLEEVOV 
TELUlrtKc•) 
(Sextus, M. 2.62), and Cicero's youthful 
'persuadere dictione' (de inv. 1.6) to Capella's (5.439, p. 152.10Of. Willis) 'persuadere 
id, quod est propositum, dictione.' 
To achieve his goal a speaker would appeal to his audience's prejudices, vested 
interests, emotional ties, loyalties, sense of humour, common sense, and aesthetic 
sensibilities, as well as to its powers of reason, to its moral beliefs, and, of course, to 
the law: hence the standard observation that the orator has to instruct, please, and 
move his audience (Cicero, orator 69; Quintilian 3.5.2, cf. 5.pr. 1). Different parts of 
an oration could be assigned these different purposes (e.g. Cicero, part. orat. 4; 
8 The fictitious deliberative or forensic orations, the suasoriae or controversiae, need not 
detain us: any contributions Stoic rhetoricians may have made to the ancient debate over the 
usefulness of such exercises (summarised by Quintilian, 2.10. 1ff.) have not survived, and there is 
no point even looking for a purely aesthetic appreciation of them in the early Stoa. Later on, 
Posidonius may have entered into a related controversy about the GEts"g: see n. 20. On 
declamatio, see S..F. Bonner, Roman Declamation (Liverpool, 1949); M. Winterbottom, ed., 
Roman Declamation (Bristol, 1980); Russell, Greek Declamation cited n. 4. On epideic- 
tic's historical origins, and its traditional association with a more ornate style, see e.g. D. A. 
Russell and N. G. Wilson, Menander Rhetor (Oxford, 1981), xi ff. 
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Quintilian, 8.pr.7), and Cicero at least associated them systematically with the 
stylistic trichotomy - grand, plain, and smooth or middle - which was perhaps the 
commonest variant of the doctrine of the genera dicendi (orator 69). The key is 
appropriateness: matter must find its proper expression, and consideration has also 
to be given to the (ostensible) character of the speaker, his client,9 and his audience, 
indeed to all the circumstances of the case (Cicero, orator 70, 100-101, 123, de or. 
3.210-12; Quintilian 8.3.11-14). But conventional rhetorical wisdom stressed the 
often crucial r6le of appeals to the emotions. Quintilian puts it succinctly: 'And 
indeed this briefest of precepts can be given to both parties [sc., to a case] alike: that 
the orator should place before his eyes every strong point in his case, and when he has 
seen what in the facts of the matter is, or could seem, invidious, pleasing, hated, 
pitiful, he will say the things he would be most moved by were he the judge' 
(6.1.11; cf. de or. 2.185ff.). 
The importance, and the difficulty, of using language in the way precisely calculated 
to have the desired effect on an audience, was not underestimated, at least by the best 
teachers. Quintilian reminds his readers that this is the 'partem operis, ut inter omnes 
oratores convenit, difficillimam' (8.pr.13). He also usefully sums up the advantages 
earned by an ornate style. It is not enough to speak clearly and correctly, for that is 
rather to lack faults than achieve excellence; to win popular approval, and not merely 
the approbation of the better sort, the speaker must be able to call on the other 
qualities of style: 'cultu vero atque ornatu se quoque commendat ipse qui dicit et in 
ceteris iudicium doctorum, in hoc vero etiam popularem laudem petit, nec fortibus 
modo, sed etiam fulgentibus armis proeliatur' (8.3.2.). Brilliant successes are won by 
brilliance of style, sweeping the audience literally off its feet (4; cf. Cicero, de or. 3.53). 
Further, rhetorical ornament helps one's cause: 'nam, qui libenter audiunt et magis 
attendunt et facilius credunt, plerumque ipsa delectatione capiuntur, nonnumquam 
admiratione auferuntur' (5). Cicero's Crassus stresses the importance of rhetorical 
amplification ('amplificare rem ornando') for making what is being said seem 
trustworthy ('ad fidem orationis faciendam'), whether the speaker is explaining 
something or rousing the emotions - particularly the latter (de or. 3.104-5). It is one 
of Cicero's favourite themes (e.g. de or. 3.96ff.), echoed wholeheartedly by Quintilian 
(8.pr. 18ff.), that too much time and effort were expended by contemporary teachers 
and students of rhetoric on empty tricks of style; and both Cicero (e.g. de or. 3.54-5, 
74ff.) and Quintilian (1.pr.9, 12.1.1ff.) regard as central to their task the description 
of an educational programme for a modern version of the model of Roman oratory 
which was both described and shaped by the elder Cato, the vir bonus dicendi 
peritus.'0 But their disapproval only highlights how far style had come to occupy 
central stage in the teaching of oratory. 
9 In Rome representation by a 'professional' orator was far more common than under 
classical Greek law: see for example K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley/Los 
Angeles, 1968), chs. 8, 9. (I put 'professional' in quotation marks because in law no fees could 
be received.) The Greek logographos has thus to be able to write himself into another's character. 
But writing 'in character' was no less important for the Roman orator, who needed to put across 
to his audience both the (moral) character he wished to project, and the character he wished his 
client to seem to possess; and there was also the task of introducing one's opponents, as well as 
fictitious or historical personages. The motive, of course, was to appear as plausible as possible. 
On Roman procedure, see Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric (cited n. 2), pp. 8ff. 
10 This definition of the orator, attributed to Cato the Elder by Seneca the Elder (contr. 
1.pr.9), may perhaps suggest Stoic influence: but its totemic r6le may be another, small 
illustration of the happy coincidence between (some of) the principal tenets of Stoic ethics, and 
Roman ideology as developed in the face of Greek culture. 
15-2 
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The texts I have been calling on all date from the last century of the Republic and 
the first of the Empire; but it is clear that the standard ingredients of the rhetorical 
curriculum had already been established by Hellenistic professionals by the time 
Cicero and the author of the ad Herennium came to the study of the subject early in 
the 1st century B.C. Reliable information about precisely when and how that 
curriculum was established is in short supply: that is, information from the period 
between, on the one hand, Aristotle and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, the oldest 
extant example of the rhetorical school text, and, on the other, Philodemus, and the 
earliest surviving contributions to the Roman rhetorical tradition: evidence from 
precisely the period that interests the scholar of early Stoicism most closely. Almost 
everything which was written during the formative period of Stoic rhetorical theory 
(as well as a good deal of what Epicureans and Peripatetics of the period may have 
had to say on the subject) has vanished without trace. Recourse must be had, in the 
first instance, to Diogenes Laertius' invaluable, if flawed, account of Stoic philosophy, 
and then, for the most part, to Cicero's peculiarly rhetorical-cum-philosophical 
treatises. 
Diogenes reports that one of the subdivisions of the Stoic science 
(crtmarL'-ur) 
of 
rhetoric, is something called bpdags, which looks to be no more than the Stoic 
counterpart to the now familiar rhetorical topic, 'expression' or 'style'. The central 
Stoic teaching on style is not, however, to be found in this scrappy and unsatisfactory 
precis of Stoic rhetorical lore. It is found instead in the bwvrj or arnp a'vovra part of 
dialectic, at Diogenes 7.59, that is, in the part of dialectic that deals with language as 
signifier rather than with the different kinds of arn1aLv'dpEva or AEKdra', which are what 
language signifies (cf.7.43, 55, 63). Dialectic and rhetoric are the two standard 
components of what the Stoa called To AoyLKdv, the 'logical' part of philosophical 
exposition (41). Stoic stylistics, as reported by Diogenes, is a version of the doctrine 
of the virtues or excellences, the dpETra', of Advos; here, correctness, clarity, 
conciseness, appropriateness, ornament. The basic framework is unsurprising, 
though the details contain some fascinating novelties. What is remarkable is that, 
according to Diogenes 7.56, Adyos is simply owv-) aUTqLaV7tKq dwrO 
6tavokt9 
EKErrELrropLE'Vq, 'significant vocal sound emitted by the mind' or (57) 'significant AetLse', 
where AetLS is articulate Owvi.11 What seem to be an offer are criteria for using 
language successfully, regardless of what one wants to say or what format it is given. 
Different criteria for poetry might reasonably be expected, and Posidonius seems to 
have consciously applied the term Aydos', at any rate in stylistic or literary-critical 
contexts, to prose as distinct from poetry.12 But it looks very much as though the 
Adyos in evidence at Diogenes 7.59 at least embraces any kind of prose. 
11 The first definition of AdOos is presumably that of Diogenes of Bablyon, for he is the 
authority cited for the definition of A(Egl which immediately precedes it. Diogenes' definition is 
slightly more sophisticated than the second (that at 7.57). His influence is perhaps confirmed by 
Galen: cf. PHP 2.130.13-15 De Lacy. That written language too comes under the scope of these 
definitions is shown, for example, by the fact that the Stoic 'parts of Adyos', the Stoic word- 
classes, are the constituents of all language, not just of significant talk. 
12 According to Posidonius' definition a poem is 'metrical or rhythmical A'Lse which 
deliberately avoids the form of Adyos (T7o AoyoEE's)'. Language thus formally achieves poetic 
status by possessing rhythm or metre. Almost any rhetorician one could name stresses the vital 
importance of prose rhythm in oratory (e.g. Aristotle rh. 3.8.1408b21ff.; Cicero, de or. 3.173ff.; 
orator 168ff.; Quintilian 9.4.52ff.), and even Theophrastus thought polished prose at least should 
have rhythm (de or. 3.184). The main debate centred on how far oratory should reproduce the 
rhythms of poetry (an unorthodox view in Dionysius, c.v. 415-17). Lack of Stoic interest in 
rhythm is at least consistent with their disapproval of the figure Hyperbaton: see pp. 416. 
Chrysippus' attitude to euphony fluctuates intriguingly: see p. 420. 
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The authorship of the classification is unknown. It may perhaps belong to Diogenes 
of Babylon (mid 2nd century B.c.), though Diogenes may simply have formalised 
earlier teaching, say, that of Chrysippus. There are two clues to authorship. First, 
there is the reference to q IEXVLK GUVvKqOELa, 'the technical usage', in the definition of 
Hellenism. This only makes sense, as Michael Frede has observed, if there is already 
a TEXV7? of Hellenism, that is, a grammar of some sort, or a proto-grammar, laying 
down rules for linguistic purity, which is not yet a wholly distinct discipline: it is still 
located in the framework of the doctrine of the virtues and vices of style within which 
it originated."' This piece of Stoic dialectic must accordingly have been formulated 
before the Stoic-influenced Pergamene school established a Stoic grammar as a 
separate discipline in the 2nd century B.C., but is unlikely to be a product of the very 
earliest years of the Stoa. Second, there is the use of the term AweLS in four of the five 
definitions of the virtues. (This might serve as a reminder that parts of speech - single 
terms - and their complexes, Adyo', contribute alike to the quality of a piece of 
prose.)14 The definition of 
AE'L• 
as any vocal articulation is attributed to Diogenes of 
Babylon (Diogenes 7.56); but it may be older. Taken together these clues suggest a 
date somewhere between the middle of the third and the middle of the second century, 
and the author(s) must also have a recognised interest in language. The obvious 
candidates are therefore Chrysippus, and Diogenes of Babylon; and in what follows 
I shall be primarily concerned with the stylistics of the early Stoa, which seems to have 
exercised an immense influence within the school. 
The difficulty, then, for reconstructing Stoic teaching on rhetorical style is not that 
there is no reliable evidence'5 for early Stoic stylistics: it is rather that the doctrine of 
linguistic excellence is located, not in rhetoric proper, but in dialectic. There is a 
famous Stoic distinction between rhetoric and dialectic according to which the former 
is the science of speaking well in a continuous narrative or exposition, and the latter 
the science of correct discussion by means of question and answer (Diogenes 7.42). 
Further, the conventionality of at least some elements in Stoic rhetorical instruction 
13 'The Principles of Stoic Grammar,' in The Stoics, ed. J. M. Rist (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 
1978), pp. 27ff., at 39-41. 
14 I would propose two further reasons why such articulate strings would be in question: (1) 
they are the bearers of ambiguity (Diogenes 7.62) and ambiguity will cause lack of clarity; and 
(2) they will also, presumably, be the primary bearers of what the Stoa would regard as 
undesirable euphonic and rhythmic properties: see further pp. 417-18. The use of the term 
qpdast in the definition of Hellenism is puzzling; I can only suggest that it is intended to exclude 
mere articulate strings of sounds or letters, for there seem to be only two Stoic offences against 
linguistic purity, barbarism, which attaches to single terms, and solecism, a fault of syntax. Yet, 
puzzlingly, the same term denotes one of the subdivisions of rhetoric, as already noted (Diogenes 
7.43). The answer may simply be that qpdats is one of the commonest Greek terms for what the 
Roman rhetoricians called elocutio: Quintilian 8.1.1. 
15 It is of course disputed how much of Diogenes Laertius' detailed report of Stoic dialectic at 
7.49-83 is an excerpt from Diocles Magnes' Survey of Philosophers (7.48). The brief survey of 
dialectic at 7.43-4 is in fact very close, in both content and arrangement, to the longer account; 
the principal difference is that in the version of Stoic logical doctrine arguably known to Diocles 
epistemology is dealt with before dialectic proper begins, at 49-54. But, whether or not it is 
specifically Diocles whom Diogenes is excerpting, one must agree with Mejer that 'the Stoic 
doxography cannot have been composed by Diogenes himself - nor can it go back to one of his 
usual sources. It must have been taken in toto from some other source' (Diogenes Laertius 
and his Hellenistic Background [Hermes Einzelschriften, 40; Wiesbaden, 1978], p. 7). The 
information about Stoic stylistics must accordingly be granted special status. For a detailed 
discussion of the arguments for and against Dioclean authorship, see Mejer op. cit., pp. 6ff.; see 
also D. Holwerda, 'De Dioclis Magnesii alterius operis vestigio neglecto', Mnemosyne 15 (1962), 
169-70. 
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is unmistakable: witness the traditional divisions of orations into forensic, 
deliberative, and encomiastic (cf. e.g. Quintilian 3.4.12ff.); of the areas of rhetorical 
expertise into discovery, expression, arrangement, and delivery - only memory, out 
of the standard list (e.g. Quintilian 3.3.1), is missing; and of the rhetorical speech 
itself - plainly the forensic only can be intended - into proemium, narrative, reply to 
opponents, and epilogue.16 That only the forensic speech is described may be an 
accident of transmission; or may be an indication that the Stoa, like most teachers of 
rhetoric, considered forensic pleading to be the most difficult of the three standard 
modes of public discourse, and accordingly devoted most time and effort to it. 
Together these facts tend to support the reasonable expectation that there was a 
rhetorical subdivision of Stoic stylistics. The truth is much stranger: in both theory 
and practice there was, strictly, no difference in style whatsoever between the 
discourse of the Stoic dialectician, and that of the Stoic orator. 
An important preliminary point is that both definitions refer to Adyot. Diogenes 
Laertius reports (7.47, 48) that without dialectic the sage will not 'be infallible iv 
Adyw', or 'prove himself sharp-witted and acute and generally formidable iv Adyots; 
for it belongs to the same man to discuss and to reason correctly, and to the same man 
both to discuss given topics and to answer the question posed.' Reasoning, debating, 
discussing an issue, and answering questions are not conceived of as radically 
different activities; it is one and the same science, dialectic, that teaches them all; and 
they are all manifestations of the same tLd6eOLs, which is the science of dialectic seen 
as a state of its possessor's soul, the soul of the sage. What must still be at work here, 
even in this sophisticated and complex classification of the sage's dialectic abilities, is 
the influence of the historical model for dialectic, the one almost certainly inherited 
from Zeno, and before him, from Socrates: dialectic which is rationally 
conducted, public argument by question-and-answer.'7 But in other, certainly later, 
definitions - those of Chrysippus and Posidonius - this question-and-answer aspect 
of dialectic drops out of sight (Diogenes 7.62). Methodical questioning and answering 
is just one of the procedures taught by dialectic (47). So, when the wise man is said 
to be infallible and formidable iv Adyots, what should be understood by that term is 
not, or not merely, argument in the form of public dialogue, but all argument and all 
rational discourse, including the soul's silent reasoning to itself. 
It is appropriate too to conceive of Stoic dialectic as a body of scientific knowledge, 
of which the sage alone, of course, is in full possession. This science is only in part the 
science of argument. It is also the science of all rational discourse: it embraces what 
moderns label epistemology (since rational speech is the expression in language of 
mental processes and states: Diogenes 7.49), linguistics, grammar and semantics, and 
the study of linguistic ambiguity, as well as stylistics. The position of this last in 
Diogenes' account (59) might perhaps indicate a particular connection with poetics 
(60); but, on the other hand, it is surely relevant that before turning to style, Diogenes 
has been describing the parts of speech. For the first Stoic excellence is correctness: 
16 I strongly suspect that the remaining part, the 'proof', has simply dropped out of the text; 
it is impossible to believe that the Stoics simply neglected what was commonly held to be the vital 
component of any suit, proving one's case, especially in light of the Stoic reputation for 
sharpness and effectiveness in argument: see pp. 401. It is unclear why memory is absent, and 
why arrangement comes after and not before Opdc&s, its more usual position in the rhetorical 
textbooks. qpdcns is itself a conventional rhetorical term: see n. 14. 
17 For an informative discussion of the earliest Stoic dialectic, see A. A. Long, 'Dialectic and 
the Stoic Sage', in The Stoics (cited n. 13), pp. 101ff., esp. 105ff. Long argues that it was 
Chrysippus who developed the whole of Stoic dialectic (not merely formal logic) beyond its 
question-and-answer origins into a science of all rational discourse. 
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and any account of Hellenism would necessarily involve reference to the nature and 
correct use of nouns, verbs, and the other word-classes. 
This sort of broad interpretation of Stoic dialectic, taking its historical development 
into account, will be familiar, for interest has generally been focused, understandably, 
on dialectic to the near exclusion of rhetoric.'s But equally the definition of rhetoric 
should not be abandoned to unhistorical and over-literal interpretation. Rhetoric 
supervises AdyotL which are Jv 6LEdc6w, that is 'in continuous prose' or 'in narrative 
form'." There is to my knowledge no suggestion in any ancient author that Stoic 
rhetoric produced experts in all continuous or expository prose; and there is some 
good evidence against that idea. The Stoic oration, as already noted, comes only in 
the three traditional flavours, deliberative, forensic, and encomiastic (Diogenes 7.42). 
This familiar, almost hackneyed, trichotomy could surely never have been con- 
templated, let alone commonplace (as it must have been to get into a potted guide 
such as this), if the standard definition of rhetoric was so different and so 
heterodox.20 Chrysippus, for example, is known to have produced many other 
definitions of rhetoric besides the familiar and influential 'scientia recte dicendi' 
(Quintilian 2.15.34-5): itself a timely warning not to treat what can be unpacked from 
it as Chrysippus' definitive pronouncement on rhetoric. According to Plutarch's 
report of Chrysippus' On rhetoric (St. rep. 1034B) the Stoic sage PTropEVGELV KaL 
ToAt,-rEt EOaatL, 
and Chrysippus or the Stoics generally say that 'the wise alone are of 
the quality to be magistrates, judges, orators' (Diogenes 7. 122; cf. SVF 1.216, 3.615, 
618, 655). 
It will be worth exploring in a little more detail what Zeno may have had to say 
about rhetoric, and in particular what may have been the point of his famous 
comparison of rhetoric to an open hand and dialectic to a clenched fist. Zeno's own 
explanation of this curious analogy is not preserved, supposing he ever gave one, and 
only the explanations of later authorities survive. (The evidence is collected as SVF 
1.75.) It is generally agreed that what Zeno was illustrating was the terse, compact 
nature of dialectic and the expansiveness of rhetoric, which suggests that the two 
types of discourse differ only in their form: subject-matter is common.2" This surely 
calls for some explanation. The anecdote by itself, I think, supports the contention 
that the definitions of dialectic and rhetoric discussed earlier are Zeno's. The 
definition of dialectic, as already observed, seems to reflect and preserve Zeno's 
18 See for example Long, art. cit. (n. 17), 102-7. 
19 For &Wfo80S , cf. Clement, Strom. I ch. 8, ?39, vol. 2 p. 26.10 Strihlin, vol. 2 p. 30.1 Klotz, 
cf. 8 ch. 4 ?11, vol. 3 p. 203.28 Klotz; Plutarch (Fabius Maximus 16.5) applies the adjective to 
detailed, narrative history. 
20 There are other, less direct pieces of evidence that Stoic rhetoric has a narrower field of 
operations than all and any continuous discourse. Posidonius, who made at least one 
contribution to the technical side of rhetoric, in stasis theory (Quintilian 3.6.37), may have 
publicly defended the restriction of rhetoric to these narrow confines: this is implied by Plutarch's 
report (Life of Pompey 42.5) that he criticised the 2nd century B.c. rhetorician Hermagoras 
(usually credited with the 'invention' of stasis theory) on the topic of " KaO' 'Aov OjrTl(1S , i.e. the rhetorical 'thesis'. Cicero reveals (de inv. 1.8, de or. 2.65ff.) that Hermagoras and his 
followers had come under New Academic fire for failing to restrict rhetoric's field of 
activities - for poaching on philosophical and scientific territory - and this could well have been 
the point of Posidonius' criticism too. 
21 Striller saw the ghost of Aristotle stalking the Stoic ramparts at this point (de Stoicorum 
studiis rhetoricis, Breslauer phil. Abhand. I 2, Breslau, 1886, p. 19); but ghosts, of course, are 
the products of a fevered imagination, and Aristotle could not have conceded that rhetoric and 
dialectic differ only in their style of discourse. It remains doubtful that in the area of rhetoric the 
Stoa owed anything specifically to Aristotle, and their debt to Theophrastus is certainly very 
limited: see pp. 419-20. 
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authority as founder - a common enough tendency in the early Stoa - even though 
dialectic soon (perhaps already in his lifetime) broke its historical bounds. But its 
implications go further. Of course, Zeno's famous syllogisms were themselves 
snappily memorable, whatever their demerits as modes of persuasion ;22 and in his day 
there may very well have been dialectical rules limiting the sorts of answer an 
interlocutor was allowed to give (cf. Diogenes 2.135). But the key to Zeno's analogy 
is rather, I think, to take into consideration his well-attested inclination to epater le 
bourgeois. Zenonian dialectic seems to have been a mere dugout compared with 
Chrysippus' and other, later, Stoic logicians' sleek ocean-going craft. Plutarch 
reports that Zeno encouraged his pupils to study dialectic because it would make 
them able to solve fallacies (St. rep. 1034E), a policy which assigns dialectic a fairly 
limited r6le, but does at least suggest that for Zeno dialectic was tightly bound up 
with analysing arguments: to solve a fallacy is to identify what is wrong with it, and 
that demands some conception of what makes an argument 'right'.23 
So if Zeno is saying, in effect, that dialectic and rhetoric differ only in their style of 
discourse, he is, I think, stressing that rhetoric's business, no less than dialectic's is (or 
should be) argument. Provided always the two definitions are intended as parallel, 
which is a plausible enough assumption, the Adyot in question would originally have 
been closest to 'arguments' in the sense of 'rational public exchanges'; and if the 
definitions are his, or have his approval, then Zeno may have wanted (charac- 
teristically enough) to annoy the rhetorical establishment by dismissing everything 
apart from sheer argument as irrelevant, for rhetoric and dialectic alike. 
Contemporary rhetoricians, for whom the debate about logical validity currently 
raging in the philosophical schools was only indirectly of interest, and who were 
certainly not bound by the austere morality of Stoicism, could not intelligently have 
accepted Zeno's comparison or simply ignored the challenge it represented: which is 
how Zeno's taste for controversy would have been satisfied (though, ironically, the 
rhetoricians who report his comparison think it useful and apposite). Like the 
definition of dialectic, 'Zeno's' definition of rhetoric would have been suitably 
interpreted and qualified by later Stoics to fit different, more complex, demands, 
above all by restricting it to conventional, institutionalised, contexts and formats. But 
this particular heterodoxy never lost its real force. What distinguishes Stoic orators 
and rhetoricians is their skill and shrewdness in argument and the importance they 
attached to proof. The partial compromise with the rhetorical establishment could 
never disguise Stoic oratory's origins as open-handed dialectic. 
In fact the real problem, the one described earlier - that the doctrine of linguistic 
excellences and defects falls within dialectic, not rhetoric - seems only to have shifted 
its ground a little, not gone away at all. Even if dialectic in its mature form is the 
science of reasoning and rational discourse, it is now clearer than ever that rhetoric 
is none the less restricted to the traditional varieties of formal, public speechifying: 
which points to a far sharper distinction than the definitions I began with would 
suggest. In particular, it still seems reasonable to look for a more or less separate set 
of narrowly rhetorical virtues and vices. Should not dialectical discourse and 
rhetorical Kunstprosa conform to different stylistic rules? 
The answer to that question can only be a resounding negative. What cannot fail 
to be felt is the stress the sources for Stoic rhetoric place on two features above all: 
22 M. Schofield, 'The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium', Phronesis 28 (1983), 31ff., esp. 51. 
23 I am being intentionally vague, in order to skirt the difficult topic of what Zeno thought 
made an argument valid or probative: cf. Jacques Brunschwig, 'Proof Defined', in Doubt and 
Dogmatism, edd. M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (Oxford, 1980), pp. 125-60, esp. 155-60; 
and Schofield, art. cit. (n. 22), 54-5. 
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its literary poverty, and its argumentative richness. Here Cicero is the best available 
authority, though of course his evidence has to be handled with care, given his own 
ambitions to create a philosophical rhetoric. 
Crassus, who by and large is Cicero's spokesman in the de oratore, presents an 
assessment of each of the leading Hellenistic philosophical schools from the point of 
view of discovering 'which most nearly approaches the orator' ('quae oratori 
coniuncta maxime', 3.64); which, that is, is best suited to meet the orator's educational 
and stylistic needs. The Stoics he dismisses on what will become familiar enough 
grounds. In the first place (65), many Stoic ethical tenets are hopelessly at odds with 
the realities and demands of public and political life. Second, 'they have too a style 
of discourse that is perhaps subtle and doubtless sharp-witted, but, in an orator, 
feeble, unfamiliar, harsh to the public ear, obscure, hollow, spiritless, yet of the sort 
that cannot possibly be employed on the public; for different things seem to be good 
and bad to the Stoics and to other citizens - or rather other nations: "honour", 
"disgrace", "reward", "punishment", have a different force; whether rightly or not 
is of no importance for the present; but were we to adopt that usage, we would never 
be able to express anything in language' (66). 
This passage is initially puzzling because it seems to suggest there existed a distinct 
Stoic oratorical style of discourse ('orationis genus'; oratio is one of Cicero's 
favoured terms for rhetorical discourse), and that it is this - as opposed to Stoic 
philosophical discourse - which Crassus dismisses out of hand. So interpreted, 
however, the passage would introduce a radical asymmetry into Crassus' evaluations 
of the main schools of philosophy. In his discussion of the Peripatetics and Academics 
(both the sceptical and the non-sceptical varieties) Crassus undoubtedly focuses on 
their use of language to expound and argue topics in philosophy, as, for example, in 
Arcesilaus' attack on dogmatic epistemologies (67). In all consistency his earlier 
assessment of the Stoic 'orationis genus' should be an assessment of the use of 
language by Stoics engaged in philosophy, not of the use of language by Stoic orators. 
The value of that earlier passage actually seems to lie in Crassus' unspoken 
assumption - and we can only trust that he was well-informed on the matter - that 
the Stoic style he deprecates is the style a Stoic or Stoic-influenced orator would use: 
there is no alternative Stoic rhetorical style on offer. 
Even were the existence of a theoretically distinct Stoic rhetorical style to be 
inferred from Crassus' remarks, Crassus himself would warn us not to expect 
differences in practice. Elsewhere (de or. 2.159) he describes in similar, and similarly 
uncomplimentary, terms what the context shows must be Stoic philosophical 
language: '...and he [sc., the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, cf. 157] brings with him a 
style of language that is not transparent, not relaxed and flowing, but feeble, dry, 
broken, and disjointed, which, if anyone approves of it, they will approve of only in 
such a way as to admit its unsuitability for an orator...'. 
Passages in the Brutus and the Paradoxa Stoicorum confirm not only that Stoic 
discourse is unitary - that Stoic philosophers and Stoic orators speak the same 
dialect - but also that the Stoic discourse Crassus rejects as useless to the ideal orator 
is in fact that recommended by the Stoa: it is not the product of an unsuccessful 
attempt to meet some more conventionally 'oratorical' ideal, but the Stoic paradigm 
of linguistic expression. (Of course, we could not charitably expect it to be otherwise: 
to put only admitted failures into the dock would considerably weaken Crassus' 
case.) 
Brutus observes that only Cato, of all the Roman Stoic orators, achieved 'summam 
eloquentiam'; the others he mentions - Fannius, Rutilius, Tubero - had little or no 
eloquentia to their name (Brutus 118). Cicero agrees, but explains Cato's success by 
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outside coaching: 'Your uncle, though, as you know, gets from the Stoics what was 
to be sought from them, but learned to speak from the masters of speech, and trained 
himself after their fashion' (119). I will return to this assessment of Cato's education 
later. The point to note here is that according to Brutus (and again Cicero agrees) all 
the other Stoic orators, Greek and Roman, simply transferred the language they used 
for dialectic to the public domain: 'I see this same thing happening amongst our 
people as amongst the Greeks - that almost all the Stoics are extremely intelligent in 
debate, and they do it skilfully, and are almost so many verbal architects; but 
transferred from discussion to public speaking, they prove poverty-striken' (118). In 
his reply, Cicero allows that the Peripatetics and New Academics fall as far short of 
the oratorical standard as do the Stoics, but for quite the opposite reasons: 'For just 
as the Stoics' discourse (oratio) is too concise and a little too compressed for the needs 
of an ordinary audience, so theirs is freer and more diffuse than the custom of the 
courts and of public life allows' (120). It is clear that Cicero is thinking of the schools' 
philosophical language (note the references to the glories of Plato's, Aristotle's, and 
Theophrastus' language at 121) - which makes his use of the term oratio (119, 120) 
for 'discourse' all the more telling (cf. p. 401 above). As for the Stoics, their rhetorical 
poverty is easily explained:....all their care is lavished on dialectic; no use is made of 
that discursive and flowing and varied style of discourse' (orationis genus)' (119). But 
we can go further: it not that Stoic orators and philosophers merely fail in practice 
to use language bearing the Ciceronian seal of approval. Brutus' observations, 
whatever value we attach to their assessment of the orators' merits, at least reveal that 
Stoic rhetorical language just is the language of dialectic. When Rutilius or any other 
Stoic turns to public speaking he does not even try to master some other, oratori- 
cal, Stoic discourse: none is available - except outside Stoicism altogether, in the 
conventional schools of rhetoric. Stoic skill and experience in dialectic and the 
language of debate are unrivalled, and Stoic orators fail because all that skill and 
experience count for less than nothing in the field of oratory; but no rival Stoic model 
of rhetorical language exists to which they could turn. 
A similar picture can be pieced together from the preface to the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum (1-3). Cicero begins by praising Cato for his success in making even 
weighty and unfamiliar philosophical issues 'persuasive', probabilia, to the senate (in 
other words, deliberative oratory is in question). Which is all the more of an 
achievement, Cicero continues, because Cato, whom he describes as 'in my opinion, 
a perfect Stoic' (' perfectus mea sententia Stoicus'; cf. Brutus 118) 'both holds beliefs 
which are by no means accepted by ordinary people, and belongs to that school which 
does not pursue the flower of eloquence or treat its evidence expansively, but achieves 
its purpose by tiny little questions, like pinpricks'.24 Cato's success is all the more 
remarkable because the philosophy he popularises is generally unpopular, and 
because his style of discourse, the style he uses in the senate, is not calculated to 
please. The passage from the Brutus quoted earlier reveals that Cicero regarded 
Cato's eloquentia as the result of his orthodox rhetorical education, and not of his 
Stoicism. But Cicero's praise of Cato's success in the senate would lose all point if the 
language Cato adopts in public life were not the language of Stoicism - a fact 
confirmed by Cicero's own words: Cato belongs to a philosophical sect that 'does not 
pursue the flower of eloquence'. The Stoa as a school makes no effort to cultivate 
oratory's hothouse blooms. 
There are other useful references in Cicero to Stoic rhetorical teaching, and in 
24 Cf. de or. 2.158: the Stoic dialecticians 'ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus'. 
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particular teaching on style. Chrysippus' lack of'hanc dicendi ex arte aliena [i.e. from 
the art of oratory] facultatem' did not stand in the way of his services to philosophy 
(de or. 1.50). There is the famous remark that both Chrysippus and Cleanthes wrote 
rhetorical textbooks but that only someone who wanted never to open his mouth 
would benefit from them (de fin. 4.7). Stoic style is called 'rather down at heel', 
squalidius (de fin. 4.5), in comparison with the elegance of Academic and Peripatetic 
writings; and in general terms Stoic language comes off worse in any comparison of 
the styles of the main philosophical schools (see especially de or. 3.67ff.). Now Cicero, 
of course, has his own reasons for disliking Stoic style. He argues that as Stoic 
language is inappropriate to the seriousness and loftiness of its themes it cannot move 
anyone, cannot convince or improve. He warmly and repeatedly advocates what he 
sees as a more rhetorical - a more eloquent, more flowing, more copious - style of 
discourse for philosophy, and wishes to 're-unite' oratory and philosophy as they 
were in the days before Socrates, who was directly responsible for the rift between 
eloquence and philosophy, and also, indirectly, for the factionalism of the post- 
Socratic schools (de or. 3.60f.). The ideal is presented at Tusc. Disp. 1.7: 'hanc etiam 
perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose 
posset ornateque dicere'; and Crassus envisages an ideal discourse that embraces the 
functions of rhetoric and philosophy alike (de or. 3.76). As a result, Cicero's 
assessment of Stoic style must be hostile and accordingly to some unknown extent, 
perhaps, unreliable. Indeed the crabbedness and austerity he scorns are, as we will see, 
belied by his praise for what he explicitly calls Cato's Stoic ornamented style, as well 
as by Stoic provision for approved emotional content in all discourse. At stake is 
something deeply serious: what people should and do find persuasive, especially 
where what is at stake for them is the state of their souls and the whole conduct of 
life. This issue will surface again later. The initial contention, though, is unchallenged. 
On Cicero's evidence there is no radical distinction between the approved Stoic 
philosophical style, the style circumscribed by those five excellences reported by 
Diogenes, and the approved style of Stoic oratory, which takes it basic qualities, like 
its concern with argument, from dialectic. 
Cicero has also usefully highlighted for us one of the most significant differences 
between Stoic and conventional rhetoric. The critical terms Crassus applies to Stoic 
style (cf. p. 401 above) all serve to place it in Cicero's version of the 'three styles' 
theory mentioned earlier. It is tacitly classified as a very poor example of the first, 
plain, style, with the plain style's characteristic faults, being insipid, dry, feeble, and 
not even lucid. (Crassus himself is later made to observe that this 'fine' or 'subtle', 
tenuis, style should not be 'lacking in force and vigour', should not be 'sine nervis ac 
viribus', 3.199.) The plain style, in Cicero's eyes, is especially suitable for one of the 
orator's three tasks or officia, informing his audience. Cicero, like most other 
rhetoricians, as we saw, allots the orator two further officia: moving the emotions and 
pleasing an audience. Quintilian in fact rejects a claim that the only natural eloquence 
is everyday speech, on the grounds that it is incumbent on the orator not only to teach 
but also to sway the feelings and to delight his audience.25 I am not suggesting that 
25 According to the theorists Quintilian is criticising, the natural officium of words is 'to be 
slaves to sense', servire sensibus. Things have their own names, and there is no need for circuitus 
or translatio (apparently blanket terms for periphrasis, tropes, and all rhetorical ornament); the 
oldest orators used to speak 'maxime secundum naturam', but later adopted a more 'poetic' 
language (12.10.41-2). Quintilian replies (43) that the orator has not only to 'state the facts', but 
to please and move his audience, and to do so he uses the 'adiutoria quae sunt ab eadem natura 
nobis concessa'. The position he rejects could well form part of a (Stoic-influenced) Atticising 
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the Stoics themselves described their own oratory as 'plain', or that they borrowed 
any non-Stoic critical terminology: only that Cicero classified in the conventional 
manner the distinctive quality he has detected in Stoic oratory, its emphasis, almost 
to the exclusion of everything else, on informing, and in the case of the Stoa, on 
instruction above all by shrewd and subtle argumentation, which conventionally is 
but one weapon in the orator's armoury (cf. e.g. ad Her. 2.27-30; Cicero, de inv. 
1.34ff.; Quintilian 5.8-14). Quintilian provides confirmation: 'Minus indulsere 
eloquentiae Stoici veteres; sed cum honesta suaserunt tum in colligendo probandoque 
quae instituerant plurimum valuerunt, rebus tamen acutis magis quam, id quod sane, 
non adfectaverunt, oratione magnifici' (10.1.84; cf. 12.2.25). If the sage is 'formidable 
iv Adyots' in virtue of his dialectical training, his dialectical ability will none the less 
take as its field of operations all discourse wherever required, including some parts of 
rhetorical speeches. Here, more than anywhere, the dividing line between dialectic 
and rhetoric begins to blur.26 
Other divisions of the rhetorical speech required, not argument, but rather 
exposition or summary. Available evidence strongly suggests that simplicity and 
straightforwardness of language would also have been prescribed at least in two of the 
non-argumentative parts of the speech, in the proemium and epilogue; and that 
appeals to the emotions were out of bounds. 
Here two especially useful pieces of information are available. First, Chrysippus is 
reported to have wanted the epilogue of a speech to be 'unipartite', tovotEp4sg (R.G. 
2.454,1 Sp. = SVF 2.296). The context shows that this one part is to be a summary 
of the speaker's case. The professional rhetoricians, in contrast, typically dictate that 
the epilogue (of a forensic oration) can and on most occasions should have another 
part, an appeal to the feelings of the judges or the audience; and that sometimes 
one can do without the summary altogether, and sometimes without the appeal 
(ad Her. 2.47-50; Cicero, de inv. 1.98ff., part. orat. 52ff.; Quintilian 6.1.1ff.). 
Quintilian points out the dangers of bald repetition: 'alioqui nihil est odiosius recta 
illa repetitione velut memoriae iudicum diffidentis' (6.1.2). The point of Chrysippus' 
injunction is not hard to see. It is instructive to contrast these remarks of 
Quintilian's: 'Most of the Atticisers and almost all the philosophers who wrote 
something on rhetoric, approved only of this type of epilogue [i.e. the enumeratio, 
recapitulation]. I believe the Atticisers27 held this opinion because at Athens the orator 
was forbidden, through the medium of the herald, to move the emotions. I am less 
surprised at the philosophers, for whom it is practically a vice to be emotionally 
moved...Yet they will admit that emotions are necessary, if truth and justice and the 
diatribe, rather than being authentically Stoic (or Epicurean). The Stoic contribution to Roman 
Atticism is disputed; Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric (cited n. 2), 241-2, 338-9, argues convincingly 
that Atticism is, unusually, an original Roman contribution to stylistics, without Greek 
precedents. 
26 Philodemus, unfortunately in a very fragmentary context, refers to some people who 'have 
taken their technical matter (i rTEXVLtK) from other (r<Tvat), e.g. certain eristic matters and 
the business of ambiguities from dialectic' (rh. 2. 67.7-68.12 Sudhaus). This text shows at the 
very least that the question of shared TEXVLKd - which presumably are or include OEowpr•tiaa, 
the theorems of a science or expertise - was debated in Hellenistic times. 
27 Quintilian must mean 'Atticisers' rather than 'Athenians'; his point is that the Atticists, 
with their concern for unadorned, emotionally restrained discourse, appealed to classical 
Athenian procedural law as providing a model for the structure of the oration which happily 
suited their antipathy to ornament and emotional stridency. Their appeal seems to have little 
historical basis: see Butler's note ad loc. (Loeb tr., vol. 2, p. 386 n.1). 
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public interest cannot otherwise be secured' (6.1.7).28 I have little doubt that the 
Stoics are the philosophers whom Quintilian represents as regarding emotional 
responses as vicious. The real Stoic position is more complicated, as we will see, but 
hardly less palatable. 
The second piece of evidence concerns the introduction to the oration, ITpoot4Lov 
(Diogenes 7.43). Professional rhetoricians commonly distinguished between two 
types of exordium, which in general is supposed to render the audience 'benivolum, 
attentum, docilem' ('well-disposed, attentive, and looking for instruction'), as 
Quintilian puts it (4.1.5). One is a straightforward sketching of what one is going to 
say and argue, and is typically called the proemium or principium. It is appropriate in 
easier, for example straightforwardly honourable cases. Where, though, one has, for 
instance, to take a stand against a good or poor or sick man, or one's own case is, say, 
difficult to prove, or dishonourable, the speaker has to be tricksier and then the 
introduction is called the •o8oss, whose Latin name insinuatio, is revealing: 'the 
ingratiation (insinuatio) is discourse (oratio) that steals into the hearer's mind by a 
kind of dissembling, and by obscure indirectness' ('quadam dissimulatione et 
circuitione obscure' (Cicero, de inv. 1.20). If the Stoic rhetoricians knew of this 
distinction - and as it is familiar to the author of the ad Herennium (1.5, 9; 
cf. Quintilian 4.1.48) it must already have been commonplace in Greek rhetorical 
handbooks - then it seems likely their intention was to eliminate tricksiness and 
deliberate obscurity from their introductions; and it is reasonable to suppose that that 
injunction extended to language. This point should not be overstressed, for it was an 
old and well-established rule that the exordium must be simple in style (Quintilian 
4.1.58-60) - though that very simplicity could itself be a form of insinuatio (60). 
What one really wants to know now, is why: why there is a Stoic doctrine of style 
at all, and why it includes what it does. It is hardly unreasonable to expect reasoning 
behind that doctrine, and reasoning of a high level; for, however brief and distorted 
Diogenes' and Cicero's reports and comments may be, behind them lies what some 
Stoic or group of Stoics had to say about rhetoric, and the Stoics were of course 
philosophers, some of them brilliant and original, whose arguments could be weighty 
and impressive, and who prided themselves on the unity and coherence of their 
philosophy. The remainder of this paper will be an attempt to reconstruct one of 
those arguments. I believe it was an important argument, one taken seriously by the 
men who were regarded, and who regarded themselves, as specifically Stoic orators. 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with a comparison between Stoic attitudes to 
rhetoric and those of the other most influential dogmatic school of the Hellenistic era, 
the Epicurean. Stoics and Epicureans famously disagreed over whether the wise man, 
the paradigm of human perfection, would or would not take part in politics 
(Epicurus: S.V. 58, Diogenes Laertius 10.119; Stoics: e.g. Cicero, de fin. 3.68, 
Diogenes 7.121). Epicurus' disapproval of conventional ambition and power 
politicking extended to the 'fancy speechifying' ( rqropEVa'EtV KaA(5g, Diogenes 
10.118) and panegyric (120) such a life would entail, though he conceded that the wise 
man would bring court cases (120a, &tKdaEaOat). The notorious injunction to 'flee all 
"R Graeven ad loc. (Cornuti Artis Rhetoricae Epitome, edition and commentary by J. Graeven 
(Berlin, 1891, repr. Dublin/Zfirich, 1973), ?207, p. 41.10ff. = 1.454.1.1ff. Sp.) doubts whether 
Quintilian is referring to Stoic (and Platonic) views, but he gives no reason for this scepticism. 
(Graeven's identification of Cornutus as the author of the original version of this handbook has 
not been accepted: see Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric [cited n. 2], 616 n. 5). For Stoic influence on the 
Atticisers, see n. 25. 
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learning' (10.6) was taken by professional rhetoricians, at any rate, to apply to the art 
of oratory (cf. e.g. Quintilian 12.2.24).29 
In contrast, the doctrine that the sage will play politician, where circumstances 
allow (Diogenes 7.121), is deeply embedded in Stoic social and political theory. Two 
important texts will point the contrast. First, according to Chrysippus,30 amongst 
others, the sage will take part in politics if nothing prevents him, 'for he will both 
restrain vice and promote virtue' (Diogenes loc. cit.). Presumably this at least means 
that the power, money, influence, family connections, and so on the wise man may 
gain in the course of his career will widen his scope for action, for virtuous choosing 
and rejecting.31 The passage will, however, bear another interpretation as well. The 
sage cannot hope to people the world with other sages, and sages alone are virtuous 
and perform virtuous acts. Yet he might by his own words and actions try to 
encourage ordinary people to perform acts which would be (perfectly) virtuous, if 
performed by the sage - the 'intermediate' acts which are still 'duties' (KaO-rKov7a) 
even if an ordinary person performs them, and which, if always or regularly 
performed, are somehow necessary for progress towards virtue.32 And we know that 
the Stoic rhetoric defined by Diogenes is a science (cf. Sextus, M. 2.6), and a virtue, 
and thus exclusive to the wise, who possess all virtues (so for example Panaetius' 
pupil Mnesarchus, ap. de or. 1.83). Why though, would the sage want to behave like 
this ? 
The answer must lie in the Stoic conception of society and the justice which binds 
it together. Cicero's Cato is made to argue that 'since we see that man is created to 
protect and preserve his fellow men, it is in agreement with this nature that the wise 
man should want to take part in politics and in governing the state...' (de fin. 3.68), 
and that 'we are driven by nature to want to benefit as many people as possible, 
especially by giving instruction and transmitting the principles of wisdom ('docendo 
rationibusque prudentiae tradendis')...Since, moreover, the nature of man is such 
that a kind of civil right (' quasi civile ius') mediates between himself and the human 
race, one who upholds this will be just, and whoever departs from it, unjust' (65, 67). 
That is, wanting to benefit others is natural, and natural for every human being, not 
merely for the sage; and instruction, especially ethical instruction, is picked out as one 
of the primary methods of doing this. Material welfare should not be considered of 
sole or primary concern. Of course, any ordinary man or woman would prefer family 
or friends or fellow citizens not to go hungry, fall sick, be poor, or be defeated in war 
and killed or enslaved, because all such conditions 'go against nature': we all 
29 Philodemus refused to admit two of the three conventional types of rhetoric, forensic and 
deliberative, as rE'XvaL, while claming special status for 'sophistic' rhetoric, which apparently 
extends to literary prose in general; but he continued to stress the importance of clarity (and 
solecism is classed as a cause of obscurity: rh. 1, pp. 157-8, col. 15.6-24 S.). He voices 
disapproval of the (panegyric) orators' lack of concern for the truth, and of their obsession with 
'mere sound, and periods, and parallel constructions, and antithetical ones, and homoioteleuta' 
by which people are 'persuaded' (bvXaywyo'.tEvoL) (1, p. 33 = 2, pp. 257-8, col. 4a.14-col. 
5a.4). Philodemus is a useful but limited source for Diogenes of Babylon's teaching on rhetoric 
(see p. 421); unfortunately the text is badly preserved and fragmentary, and it is not always 
possible to be sure who is being quoted and criticised. 
30 Chrysippus defined rhetoric as a kind of rdXVrq, and rEXvaL are not confined to the wise (cf. 
SVF 2.393). What Chrysippus meant by this is far from clear. See further, pp. 420. 
31 Nature and the things in accordance with nature are 'the principle of duty and the material 
of virtue' according to Chrysippus (Plutarch comm. not. 1069E). See B. Inwood, Ethics and 
Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), pp. 201ff. 
32 This idea of advancement to virtue through practice seems to be implied by e.g. SVF 3.500, 
510, and esp. by Cato at de fin. 3.17ff. 
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naturally prefer to live healthy, comfortable, free, lives.33 But what matters above all 
is living virtuously, and if other people are genuinely to be benefited, and benefited 
by our agency, then we must encourage them to virtue: for it is a Stoic axiom that 
only virtue and virtuous action constitute benefit.34 The natural inclination to benefit 
others must be adapted to the moral imperatives that should govern our lives; and in 
accordance with that principle others must be encouraged to choose what ordinary 
usage calls 'good' and the Stoa 'preferred' things"3 only when that choice does not 
conflict with the choosers' moral welfare. Our own moral welfare would be 
safeguarded, since we would not be primarily responsible for whatever actions our 
fellows finally perform: assent to the propositions or policies advocated is in our 
audience's power, not in ours. 
Cato does not supply a detailed programme of ways of benefiting others, by 
instructing them or otherwise, and we have to go beyond the available evidence. The 
duty to benefit others only in the approved way will have broad implications for the 
content of rhetoric discourse and the general mode of presentation. In very general 
terms, it can be inferred that taking part in politics will entail public and formal 
advocacy of policies which best accord with virtue, and opposition to wicked ones; 
the praise of virtuous individuals, objects, institutions, or communities, and the 
censure of vicious ones. A Stoic panegyric, for instance, would mention with approval 
not a man's wealth or good looks, but rather his not attaching too much importance 
to these things. A useful reminder of rhetorical orthodoxy is Cicero's treatment of 
encomium in his Partitiones Oratoriae, where virtue and vice do, admittedly, play the 
largest r6le, but goods of the body, general cultural attainments, and external goods 
are also brought into play, and practically the whole speech should be 'directed to the 
hearer's pleasure and delight' (20ff., esp. 74-5, 72, 80; and see p. 394 above on the 
aesthetic function of panegyric). 
The forensic ideal would, presumably, be to bring or defend only a morally good 
case, and to present arguments for it that are good morally as well as sound logically: 
one should not coldbloodedly try to deceive or mislead a jury or impede its progress 
toward virtue. There may have been a Stoic argument (it is attributed only to 'certain 
philosophers') that discourse of this sort, unorthodox as it might appear, is in fact 
perfectly natural. The argument assumes that we all have natural impulses to 
virtue - a commonplace in Stoicism36 - and that there is a kind of prudentia (I take 
this to be 
Opdvq•ars) 
which operates in the field of 'what must and what must not be 
said', 'in dicendis et non dicendis', just as there is prudentia determining 'what must 
and what must not be done' (cf. SVF 3.262). Accordingly we all have within us traces 
of that particular virtue, waiting to be trained and developed (Quintilian 2.20.5-6). 
This linguistic prudentia may perhaps be dialectic: for the Stoics are said to have 
defined dialectic as the 'science of speaking well', where 'speaking well', Evl AE'yEtv, 
means 'saying what is true and what is fitting', 
- dJAqO 
Kal 
t- i7TrpoaGKovwra yAEtyEL (Alexander, in top. 1.1Off.). But Stoic rhetoric is not some rival discipline, with wholly 
distinct content, aims and methods: rather it is this same 'natural' lingusitic prudentia, 
33 E.g. SVF 3.124, 128; Diogenes 7.104-5; Cicero, de fin. 3.50. Without this difference 
between objects - not a difference in moral value, but in terms of preference - there would be 
nothing for wisdom to do, nothing on which it could act. 
34 The sage and the friend are classified as 'not other than benefit (dfLLAta)': Sextus, M. 
11.22ff.; cf. Diogenes 7.103, SVF 3.104. The virtues and virtuous actions are classed as 'good' 
because benefit happens to result from them: M. 11.26. 
35 For this distinction, see e.g. Plutarch, St. rep. 1048A, a quotation from Chrysippus' rrEpL 
dya&Oev, Bk. 1. 
36 See especially SVF 1.179, 552, 186, 357a, 566; 2.1170; 3.214, 216, 234. 
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as adapted to the peculiar demands of certain forms of public, institutionalised 
discourse.37 
The political r6le and ambitions of the sage were, admittedly, transformed as the 
Stoa matured, above all as it was called on to meet the needs of Romans faced with 
the practical business of governing more and more of the known world. Zeno's early 
political radicalism could not survive intact.3s As early as Chrysippus the sage's 
preference for conventional political activity was accepted," though at this stage the 
emphasis was still rather on his place in the community of men and gods that is the 
Stoic rational cosmos (cf. Cicero, de fin. 3.66; SVF 2.528). Problems of loyalty to a 
particular state, given that the place one lives and calls one's homeland is so by a mere 
accident of birth (cf. Seneca, de otio 4.1), do not seem to have been felt as particularly 
pressing, perhaps in part as a result of the instability and fragmentation of the 
political world in which the early Stoics themselves lived. The imposition of a more 
rigid and centralised political structure by Rome brought fresh and pressing ethical 
dilemmas for rulers and subjects alike, while Stoicism itself, under the influence of 
Panaetius, enjoyed a new flexibility, with the emphasis of moral philosophy shifting 
to the individual agent and to analysing and meeting particular ethical problems. 
Panaetius seems to have considered the sage, if still the human paradigm, of little use 
to ordinary moral agents,40 but he seems not to have doubted the central tenet of 
Stoicism, that virtue alone is good."4 It is disputed whether he considered political 
leadership the ideal,42 but a natural inclination to truth and to independence - the 
37 The sage will not, admittedly, always and automatically take part in politics. This is implied 
by the principle 'the sage will enter politics, if nothing prevents him' which has already been 
quoted (Diogenes 7.121). He will prefer to do so (SVF 3.611, 686, 690), just as he will prefer to 
marry and have children. '(for) these things are in accordance with the (nature) of the animal 
which is rational, sociable, and reciprocates affection', SVF 3.686, p. 172.19-20. Stobaeus 
mentions one ground above all for the wise man's abstaining from politics, 'if he is going 
to do no benefit to his homeland' (SVF 3.690, p. 173.20-1). Indeed the question 'will the wise 
man enter politics?' became a favourite topic for declamation (Quintilian 3.5.6; Cicero, top. 82. 
Under the later Republic and the Empire commitment to political service became a hotly- 
contested issue, as Cicero and Seneca both attest (see M. Griffin, Seneca, a Philosopher in Politics 
(Oxford, 1976), ch. 10.; the Stoic position is analysed too, at pp. 340-4, and Cicero's at pp. 
344-5). But my concern here is rather with how the sage will behave once he has made the 
decision not to abstain from the life of politics, and not with his reasons for abstaining or 
quitting. 
3" For Zeno, ordinary people are 'enemies and foes and slaves and foreigners, even parents 
to their children and brothers to brothers and kin to kin' (Diogenes 7.32), whereas the good 
alone are 'citizens and friends and kin and free' (33; cf. 124, and SVF 1.262, 264). In Zeno's ideal 
republic there would be no lawcourts: Diogenes 7.33; forensic rhetoric would presumably wither 
away. (In Posidonius' Golden Age the wise were rulers and apparently there were no laws: 
Seneca, ep. 90.5.) " Stobaeus (SVF 3.686) reports that the sage will by choice take part in politics, and that 
being a king or supported by one, and being a sophist, are acceptable options too. This is 
strikingly similar to Chrysippus' account of the sage's three best methods of making a living: 
Plutarch, St. rep. 1043E. 
40 This is suggested by the anecdote recounted by Seneca, ep. 116.5; cf. also perhaps Cicero, 
de off. 1.46. 
41 Panaetius does claim that the wise man needs health, money, and strength (Diogenes 
7.128), but that this is almost certainly the familiar Stoic doctrine that he must have a sufficient 
store of 'preferred' things on which to exercise his virtue has been ably argued by J. M. Rist, 
Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 7ff. 
42 The focus of the debate is whether de off. 1.71-2 is borrowed from Panaetius (as argued by 
M. Pohlenz, Antike Fiihrertum (Teubner, 1934), pp. 46-7); on the other side J. M. Rist (op. cit. 
(n. 41), pp. 193, 200) argues that de off. 1.152-60 
is a veiled attack by Cicero on Panaetius' 
scholastic ideal. 
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reluctance to accept falsehoods or obey inferiors - is certainly central to his 
conception of human nature (Cicero, de off. 1.13-19). His Roman Republican 
follower, P. Rutilius Rufus, is credited with typically Stoic self-reliance (Cicero, 
Brutus 114-15), criticised Crassus' oratorical style (de or. 1.227-8), and was 
renowned for his virtuous conduct at home and abroad (see further, pp. 426-7). 
The Stoic view is well summed up by Stobaeus: 'Justice exists, they say, by nature 
and not by convention: accordingly the sage takes part in politics, and especially in 
such states as display some progress toward perfect government; and he makes laws, 
and educates people; and it is appropriate for good men to compose books capable 
of benefiting those who come across them, and to condescend to marriage, and raise 
children, both for his own sake and his fatherland's, and to endure on its behalf - if 
it is moderate - both hardship and death' (SVF 3.611). 
What still remains unclear is how the orator's choice of language would be affected 
by these ethical constraints. Here a piece of information from Sextus will prove useful. 
Arcesilaus is reported to have criticised the Stoics for failing to observe that assent is 
not given to impressions, as they assumed, but to propositions (Sextus, M. 7.154). 
What the Stoa intended by making impressions the object of assent is unclear, but if, 
as Michael Frede has argued,43 the point of Arcesilaus' criticism is that impressions do 
not merely have propositional content, but have other qualities besides, then this extra 
something may include or comprise both the whole psychological and physical 
condition of the person having the impression and the manner in which the 
impressions are presented. On this hypothesis, if an impression is presented by means 
of language, then a large part of its manner of presentation will be the speaker's 
precise choice of vocabulary, the arrangement of the words, their sound, the 
arrangement of subordinate clauses, and so on. The purpose of the Stoic stylistic 
precepts will then be to provide a model for presenting impressions in language such 
that nothing extraneous or inappropriate impinges on the proposition (say) being 
presented for assent, such that nothing gets in the way between the potential assenter 
and rational assessment of the proposition. Speakers have to offer the right sort of 
proposition for acceptance, but they have also to present it in the right sort of 
language. What the list of the virtues determines, in broad outline, is what 'right' 
means in this context. 
A significant qualification can now be made to our earlier outline account of Stoic 
approved style, which seemed unremittingly plain, almost harsh. Arcesilaus' criticism 
points the way to understanding how Stoic oratory can also be acceptably emotive. 
An impression can embody not merely a AEKTOdv (a proposition, a command, a 
question, and so on), but also some sort of emotional assessment of and response to 
its message, its 'signified content' strictly speaking; and where the impression is 
linguistic, signifiers can or can fail to be selected which accurately connote this 
'emotional content'. Hitherto I have stressed - as Cicero and Quintilian do - the 
argumentative strength of Stoic oratory; but appropriate stylistic embellishment will 
have been possible - indeed, will surely have been necessary - for the Stoic orator 
whenever he wished his discourse to have approved emotive force: an audience must 
assent to the nexus of contents (and we must recall that for Chrysippus' Stoa all 
emotions are judgements: cf. p. 392 above), while the ethical programme of 
benefiting-by-informing will be completed, not undermined, by instruction in, and 
induction into, morally healthy emotional responses. At the same time, the perceived 
43 'The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul', in The Norms of Nature, edd. G. Striker, 
M. Schofield (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 93ff., at 104. 
410 CATHERINE ATHERTON 
stylistic plainness of Stoic oratory is easily explained by the very limited array of 
approved emotions and objects to which the Stoic speaker has access. 
Diogenes' list is extremely brief, and some of its terminology obscure - and there 
are no illustrations to help - but its peculiar combination of conventionality and 
eccentricity does begin to emerge from a comparison with versions of the doctrine in 
the professional handbooks. At first blush the list is ordinary enough, except for the 
inclusion of conciseness or brevity, avvTrota, to which I will return shortly, and for 
the fact that Hellenism and clarity are in no way set apart from the other virtues. 
There is no sign of the distinction between essential and non-essential virtues which 
is fairly common in mainstream theory, a distinction associated with the conviction 
that training in linguistic correctness (and perhaps clarity too) should be the province, 
not of the rhetorician, but rather of the teacher of (elementary or 'first') grammar (so 
Cicero, de or. 3.38, cf. 52; and esp. Quintilian 1.4.6ff., 2.1.1-3). Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, for instance, ranks purity, clarity, and brevity as 'essential virtues', 
but makes persuasiveness an 'additional virtue' alongside such qualities as charm, 
sublimity, and grandeur, which characterise different authors and different pieces of 
writing to different degrees.44 One version of the plain style of oratory described by 
Cicero possesses clarity, correctness, and conciseness, but little or nothing in the way 
of ornament (orator 20). All five Stoic excellences, in contrast, are to be found in all 
approved discourse. 
It is generally agreed that one's message must be easily intelligible. Clarity is thus 
obviously important.45 Since clarity is relative to content, speaker, and audience, 
rhetorical language will to that extent be audience-dependent: but philosophical 
discourse will of course be equally subject to this provision. The Stoic version of 
appropriateness (o 7TpE7Tov) resembles its professional counterparts far less closely. 
Within the format of his distinction between g80s and 7TadOo and the associated forms 
of (artificial) proof, Aristotle had laid down that the orator must express himself in 
a way appropriate not merely to his subject, but to his audience, the (moral) character 
he wishes to project, and the emotion he is projecting (rh. 1.2.1356alff., cf. 
8.1365b21ff., 2.12.1388b31ff., the audience's character; 3.7.1408a25ff., the speaker's 
character; 2.1.1377b20ff., arousing emotion); and this principle was adapted and 
closely followed by later rhetoricians, especially in their treatment of style. Such 
appropriateness produces plausibility: the audience will be convinced that the speaker 
is trustworthy and sincere (1356a4-7), and its judgement will be affected by the 
emotional state induced in it by the speaker (14ff.). Appropriateness was considered 
by Quintilian to be the most important quality, for without it purity, clarity, and 
embellishment are vain (11.1.2, and ff.), and he promises a lengthy treatment to aid the 
beginner (5); the rule is to judge what is suitable 'in conciliando, docendo, movendo 
iudici' (6), and in particular attention must be paid to the speaker's character, 
especially his moral quality (16ff.), the character of any fictitious personages 
introduced (3 1ff.), the character (especially rank and status) of the hearers (43ff.), the 
time and place (46f.), and the emotion consonant with the pleaders' circumstances 
(48ff.). Fancy tricks of style are of no use to the man arraigned on a capital charge; 
they will simply alienate the audience's sympathy (49-50). Cicero's Crassus remarks 
1" On Dionysius, see Russell, Criticism (cited n. 5), p. 137, and S. F. Bonner, The Literary 
Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 18ff. 
5 The pretty well universal ancient assumption in literary criticism (and teaching of 
composition) that any discourse has content independent of language, is clearly shared by the 
Stoa; and thus can win no place in an attempt to isolate and explain crucial differences between 
Stoic and professional rhetoric. 
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that 'non omni causae nec auditori neque personae neque tempori congruere 
orationis unum genus' (de or. 3.210), and Cicero himself argues that propriety is to 
be observed 'non in sententiis solum sed etiam in verbis; non enim omnis fortuna non 
omnis honos non omnis auctoritas non omnis aetas nec vero locus aut tempus aut 
auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est aut sententiarum, semperque 
in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat considerandum; quod et in re de qua 
agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audiunt' (orator 
71ff.).46 
In contrast, Stoic appropriateness is appropriateness simply to the object in 
question, the Tpdiypa: no other factors are mentioned. The true nature and quality 
of the subject of discourse have to be straightforwardly communicated. An audience's 
assent cannot be secured by winning its pity or admiration, or by arousing its anger, 
or by playing on its snobbery or stupidity or vulgarity. Accordingly, the orator's 
language cannot be put to the service of any of these low purposes. Yet it can quite 
properly be deployed to create impressions whose content partly constitutes an 
accurate communication of an object's true nature precisely by embodying, and (if 
assented to) arousing in the hearer, a good emotional response to that object. Base 
and irrational emotions are not to be felt by the speaker or aroused by him in his 
audience, but certain subjects of discourse would not be treated as they deserve if their 
moral qualities were not permitted to be appropriately emotive; and allowance will 
also, I suppose, be made for acceptable emotional responses to the natural objects of 
preference, such as health and homeland. At the same time, no attention will be paid 
to speaking as plausibly as one can by adapting one's style, though presumably clarity 
is not to be sacrificed. (Regrettably, the terseness of the Diogenes account will allow 
nothing more than speculation as to the way the virtues are to be balanced one against 
the other to produce harmonious discourse.) 
Conciseness, or brevity, is the outstanding peculiarity of the Stoic theory. It is the 
one new item the Stoics have added to Theophrastus' list (Cicero, orator 79) of the 
linguistic virtues. Crassus mentions only purity, lucidity, ornament, and ap- 
propriateness as the features he believes good discourse must boast (de or. 3.37). The 
professional rhetoricians describe brevity as a desirable feature only in certain 
sections of a rhetorical speech, above all in the narrative (cf. p. 394 above), and in the 
parts of the epilogue devoted to a summary of the case (so for example Quintilian 
6.1.2) and to the appeal to the audience's pity (ad Her. 2.50, Cicero, de inv. 1.109). In 
fact it is permitted wherever it may be appropriate elsewhere: in a fairly 
straightforward case a lengthy introduction, for example, or a lengthy summary, 
would tell against the speaker's interests, by boring the audience and implying it was 
too stupid to remember what has been said. The ad Herennium (2.47ff.) and Quintilian 
46 Cf. orator 71-2: 'Quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt 
et eorum qui audierunt. Itaque hunc locum longe et late patentem philosophi solent in officiis 
tractare - non cum de recto ipso disputent, nam id quidem unum est...'. The philosopher most 
closely associated with the topic of duty is Panaetius, and it looks likely that Cicero has at least 
been inspired by Panaetius' work in his own analysis of the oratorical qualities appropriate to 
each character and each station in life; Panaetius' ethical scheme for adapting one's behaviour 
to one's r6le is outlined at de off. 1.107ff. Whether Panaetius adapted his notion of individual 
appropriateness to discourse is, as far as I know, not recorded, although he was a teacher of the 
famous Stoic Rutilius Rufus, whose oratory was so unsuccessful: see pp. 426-7. The 
unorthodoxy of the sort of appropriateness the Stoics may have had in mind is perhaps 
illustrated by Zeno's claim that 'nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu' (SVF 1.77): since there 
is nothing naturally obscene, language used to denote it cannot be obscene either. Hence there 
will be no need for polite circumlocutions, whatever the audience or circumstances of 
utterance. 
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(6.1.2ff.) offer especially informative accounts of the value and place of brevity in 
the oration. 
For the Stoa, conciseness is always and by definition a desirable characteristic of 
discourse. The descriptions of Stoic style in Cicero support this surprising fact; but 
he offers no explanation for it, and neither does Diogenes. Malcolm Schofield's 
attempt to explain Zeno's famous emphasis on brevity suggests the line to take: 'If 
you want an argument to be as safe and strong as possible, then you must keep it as 
short as possible. Safeness and strength are at least characteristically the sorts of 
argumentative virtues looked for by philosophers keen to make their arguments 
probative.'"7 The Stoic orator must ensure that the linguistic presentation of the 
arguments he relies on so heavily is as brief as the arguments themselves or as their 
constituent premisses - those 'tiny little questions, like pinpricks' (cf. p. 402 
above)- so that the arguments' content and structure are accurately conveyed 
through the medium of words. More conventionally, narrative, summary, and other 
continuous discourse must be brief, comprising only 'the essentials for signifying the 
matter', as Diogenes reports, but the Stoic orator's aim is not to be plausible or lively 
and entertaining: rather he seems morally bound to offer for assent a reliable record 
of facts, or a straightforward summary of them and of his argumentation, though 
couched, where appropriate (and the occasions will be few), in suitably emotive 
language. Quintilian offers a useful contrast; having stated that the narrative must 
employ only 'just what is needed', he corrects himself: 'Quantum opus est autem non 
ita solum accipi volo, quantum ad indicandum sufficit, quia non inornata debet esse 
brevitas, alioqui sit indocta; nam et fallit voluptas et minus longa quae delectant 
videntur' (4.2.46; cf. 21, and his definition of narrative at 31, 33). There is certainly 
no evidence to suggest that the Stoa thought digressions and longwindedness were to 
be avoided because doing so would help a speaker hold his audience's attention. 
More puzzling is the first virtue in the list, Hellenism. It surely cannot be treated 
merely as a means to clarity, which is how Philodemus seems to approach it 
(rh. 1, p. 157, col. 15.6-p. 158, col. 16.4 Sudhaus) and how Cicero's Crassus 
certainly does (de or. 3.38). (Hellenism as originally conceived by Aristotle embraces 
clarity: rh. 3.5.1407a19ff.) Perhaps it is a minor concession to the ordinary orator's 
concern to ingratiate himself with his audience, since solecisms and barbarisms earn 
contempt and neglect (so for example Cicero, de or. 3.52), but I find this implausible. 
A more ambitious - and tentative - at least partial explanation of Hellenism's 
stylistic importance would look instead to Stoic semantics. Grammar tries to provide 
rules for the formation of correct sentences in a given language. Stoic syntax, 
however, falls under the heading of the structure of complex AEK-a', as Frede has 
shown,48 not under the part of dialectic dealing with parts of speech. Someone who 
wants to speak correct Greek must therefore also study the syntax of AEKa'd. The 
dialectician must know how to form correct complex AEK7C-, as well as the arguments 
which are sequences of 
AEK7•- 
Of one sort, the statement of d•e'wtla (thus yielding the 
Stoic equivalent of WFFs: cf. perhaps Sextus, P.H. 2.231,235). He must also, of 
course, however, be able to express them in language. Accordingly he must master 
both syntax at the level of the AEKd'v, and the nature of and distinctions between the 
7 Art. cit. (n. 22), 56. 
48 Art. cit. (n. 13), 55ff.: cf. his 'The Origins of Traditional Grammar', in Historical and 
Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, edd. R. E. Butts, 
J. Hintikka (Dordrecht/Boston, 1977), pp. 51ff., esp. 60, 68, 71, 72-4; and also U. Egli, 'Stoic 
Syntax and Semantics', in Les Stoiciens et leur logique, ed. J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1978), pp. 
135ff., esp. 138. 
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various linguistic items, the parts of speech, which correspond to or signify different 
types of AEK7dv and which are strung together to form sentences. In brief, Hellenism 
is required to regulate the articulation of thought and argument in language. The 
orator shares this need and this knowledge.49 
It is especially striking that the only Stoic concession to elegance or ornament is 
negative: the avoidance of 'vulgarity' or 'colloquialism', 18twrotaw'L. Unfortunately 
it is unclear precisely what the orator is supposed to avoid, for 18twrtao'gS and the 
associated verb 
186twTE-Etv 
seem to have no agreed meanings fixed independently of 
what individual authors assign to them, not always self-consistently. A passage from 
On the Sublime (ch. 31) will serve as an illustration. 'Longinus' praises 18twrootaid for 
its effectiveness, on the grounds that 'colloquial language' is familiar from everyday 
life, and can thus be 'far more revealing than beauty (Kda'oos)': and 'what is 
customary already carries more credence' (ro 6E a'vrl'veg MS rtaTo'TEpov) (?1). 
Herodotus is quoted to show how difficult a trick of style it is to use correctly: his 
language 'approaches very near to the common man, but does not vulgarise because 
it is <said) in a meaningful way' (Eyy&v 7TapaeVE 7Tv t18t;rlqV, &AA' OV'K tI LWTEVE 7W 
arliavr7LKe [e.g. AEyE~OaL]).50 Elsewhere 'Longinus' criticises a word in Herodotus 
for being 
t18t•WKO'd 
and 6doEtvos (43.1), but his admiration for 'colloquialism' is not 
unique: other professional rhetoricians provide rules for readmitting it because of its 
forcefulness and its potential for humour and invective. The elder Seneca (contr. 7 pr. 
5), in a critical analysis of the style of Albucius Silus, comments: 'Among the 
oratorical excellences colloquialism is rarely advantageous. Great restraint is needed, 
and the right opportunity. [Albutius] employed it with varying success...Nor is it 
remarkable if a virtue so close to vice is so hard to come by'. Quintilian agrees that 
colloquialism has to be used sparingly, but allows that it can be extremely effective, 
and regrets the artificial refinement of contemporary oratory 'which deprives itself of 
a large part of the language' through its fastidiousness (8.3.21-3). 
The Stoic position is accordingly difficult to reconstruct. By merely avoiding 
vulgarity the orator would escape ridicule, and at the very least gain a hearing. 
Alternatively, it should perhaps be borne in mind that one may be called on to speak 
in many contexts, from a noisy public assembly or courtroom to a dignified Privy 
Council; to avoid 18tw tLctd' is to eschew language which one's hearers would think 
beneath them. If so, if 18twrotaid' is not a fixed quantity, but determined by audience 
usage and expectation (just as 'Longinus', Seneca, and Quintilian all decide for 
9 A vaguer, but still powerful factor will I believe have been the Stoic assumption of the 
fundamental rationality of language, which reflects - albeit imperfectly, given its corruption 
over time - the rational ordering of the cosmos, down to the level of individuals. On the one 
hand, the structure of sentences, as noted above, is largely determined by the syntax of AEKT-d, 
which in turn appropriately articulates externally obtaining relations between particular objects 
with reference to their actions, passivities, and states; Chrysippus' interest in anomaly probably 
testifies to an acceptance of a 'basic regularity' in the relationship between language's formal 
and semantic characteristics: see Frede (art. cit., n. 48), 68-9. Stoic Hellenism is the expertise 
which extracts rules and underlying principles from linguistic data on the assumption that how 
we speak is ultimately determined, in content and structure, by reason; and will even go so far 
as to modify usage where the primitive correspondence has been unacceptably blurred or 
distorted. On the other hand, Chrysippus' reliance - on a vast scale - on everyday usage, in his 
de anima and On the passions (see n. 61) as support for Stoic (moral) psychology, rests on the 
assumption that language can be a reliable guide to the nature and quality of things in the world, 
such as the seat of the ruling part of the soul. Stoic etymology (reported e.g. by Augustine, de 
dialectica, ch. 6) attempts to provide rules for these correspondences at the level of the individual 
word. 
'5 See also D. A. Russell's note ad loc., 'Longinus' On the Sublime (Oxford, 1964), p. 151. 
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themselves what counts as 'colloquial'), it is a welcome sign of flexibility in the list 
of the Stoic virtues of style. 
I doubt, however, that merely eschewing what other people judge to be 'vulgar' or 
'colloquial' is the point of the Stoic directive. We have seen that because of his self- 
imposed moral code the Stoic orator will standardly defend his chosen - virtuous - 
policies, or plead his case in court, by stating or arguing for the truth. 'From 
falsehoods there arises mental disturbance, from which grow many bad emotions and 
causes of instability' (Diogenes 7.110). It seems he cannot appeal to what Stoicism 
regarded as the bad emotions, the ra'lq, grief, fear, pleasure, and desire, or to the 
intricate moral pathology of anger, pity, hatred, jealousy, Schadenfreude, and so on 
(cf. e.g. Diogenes 7.110ff.), which are his unphilosophical rival's bread and butter, 
and which are wrong precisely in that they can give rise to a bad character and to evil 
actions (cf. e.g. SVF 3.389). The only good emotions (varieties of EvTadoLta) are those 
which the sage feels (Diogenes 7.116), joy, watchfulness, and wishing, with an 
understandably limited appeal to the ordinary public: a far cry indeed from 
Quintilian's remark that the defendant will make his hearers weep with pity, and the 
prosecutor make them shed tears of indignation (6.1.9). 
Such restraints strictly regulate Cato's habitual use, 'in the Stoic manner', of 
'rhetorical embellishments' when he speaks of 'greatness of soul, of self-control, of 
death, of the whole glory of virtue, of the immortal gods, of love for one's country' 
(para. stoic. 3). These must be the subjects a Stoic would think demand and deserve 
a more eloquent, less austere language, regardless of hearers' expectations or 
prejudices, and must be described in such a way as to try to evoke the restrained and 
rational emotions appropriate to their moral quality or 'preferred' status (though 
Cicero goes on to imply, and I think with reason, that they are picked out for special 
treatment because they are far more likely to find favour with a lay, Roman audience 
than are the notorious paradoxa Cicero himself goes on to defend).51 
Elsewhere, Cato is allowed to extend the stylistic concessions mentioned by Cicero 
to strictly philosophical discourse (de fin. 3.19) -'ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam 
splendidior oratio', he remarks; as this accords so ill with the harsh things Cicero has 
to say about Stoic style elsewhere, one might suspect that the concessions are ad 
hominem. (Cicero, actually in propria persona, here grants that clarity alone is 
appropriate for certain topics, which may seem hard to square with his declared ideal 
of philosophical language at Tusc. Disp. 1.7; but there it is 'perfectam philosophiam' 
which speaks 'copiose...ornateque', and then only 'de maximis quaestionibus'. The 
whole exchange between Cato and Cicero cannot, accordingly, be simply discounted 
as an experiment, or an eccentricity, on Cicero's part.) But now we can see that 
language which is in some way distinguished from colloquial speech is indeed allowed 
by the Stoic doctrine of the linguistic virtues. The difficulty is rather Cicero's claim that 
it is Cato's conventional rhetorical training which has provided him with the orator's 
conventional weapons, while his Stoicism merely determines when and where he may 
use them with propriety. The influences on the historical Cato's rhetoric remain 
obscure; but Cicero's bias against what he sees as the stylistic impoverishment of the 
Stoa could well have blinded him to the fact that Cato might have got what he needed, 
stylistically as well as ethically, from the Stoa: for Stoic discourse is single, with 
dialectic and rhetoric conforming to the same requirements. There was no specifically 
51 Death may look like the 'odd man out' in this list of approved objects, but no doubt Cato's 
rhetorical skills would be deployed to represent death as no evil, and even as a duty in certain 
circumstances, and to evoke the (unusual) emotional responses appropriate to this Stoic 
perspective. 
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rhetorical Stoic discourse, and accordingly no training course in stylistics especially 
designed for Stoic orators. 
It is impossible to pretend that what is known of Stoic stylistics looks satisfactory, 
even by ancient standards. It appears rigid at best and unworkable at worst. 
Conciseness, for instance, is not a single quality: are all varieties of conciseness, from 
pregnant Aristotelian brevity to sententious Senecan brevity, equally acceptable? Is 
use of imagery permissible provided lucidity benefits, even if such imagery exceeds the 
strict limits of appropriate KatraaKEvj? No practical application of these principles 
- no Stoic oration - has survived, and mere speculation is worthless. It is purely by 
accident - or rather I would say through carelessness - that the rhetorician Theon of 
Alexandria seems to have preserved one small but important detail of theory. It seems 
that at least some Stoics regarded one of the traditional tropes or figures, Hyperbaton 
or transposition, which occurs when normal word-order is disturbed, not as an 
indispensable aid in creating prose rhythm (which is how the school rhetoricians 
regarded it: ad Her. 4.44; Quintilian 8.6.62, cf. 2.14-15), nor as producing tension and 
excitement (which is how the author of the treatise On the sublime analyses it: 22.3-4), 
but as producing inclarity - and thus as downright undesirable. 
Theon of Alexandria is rather an obscure figure. He may have been a contemporary 
of Quintilian, or lived later, in the 2nd century A.D.52 Of the seven works ascribed to 
him by the Suda, only the progymnasmata survives, a teacher's handbook of the 
preliminary exercises which formed the preparatory stage of instruction in rhetoric, 
including the writing of various kinds of narrative, the topic under which obscurity 
is discussed.53 Somewhere Theon found a Stoic classification of ambiguity types, and 
he records it, or part of it, within his own account of the causes of obscurity in the 
language of narrative (81.30-83.13). The list is said to be the work of 'the 
dialecticians', but its Stoic origin is proved by its close resemblance to a classification 
of ambiguities recorded by Galen in his little treatise On linguistic sophisms and there 
explicitly attributed to 'the more sophisticated Stoics'.54 
Theon apparently has little philosophical or dialectical background, though he 
expresses a belief that the young orator needs to study philosophy (2.59. 1ff. Sp.; cf. 
65.26ff.), and it is unclear whether he came across the classification in some Stoic 
stylistic, perhaps rhetorical treatise, or secondhand, in some earlier, non-Stoic 
handbook itself employing Stoic material. One of the internal features supporting the 
52 2nd century: OCD s.v.; Ist century: RE s.v., vol. va, pp. 2037-8. 
5 On the rhetorical exercises as a genre, see: esp. W. Kroll, R.E. Supp. 7, 'Rhetorik', coll. 
1118-19; G. Reichel, Quaestiones Progymnasmaticae (Leipzig, 1909); Kennedy, Art of 
Persuasion (cited n. 2), 270; Clark (cited n. 2), pp. 177ff.; S. F. Bonner, Education (cited n. 2), 
pp. 250ff. There is a new translation of Theon by J. R. Butts (Claremont, 1986). The 
progymnasmata will be referred to by the Spengel (L. Spengel, ed., Rhetores Graeci, 3 vols., 
Leipzig, 1856), volume, page, and line numbers; it begins at 2.59ff. The Stoic classification is at 
81.30-83.13. All translations are my own. 
4 On linguistic sophisms, rr7TEpL ~-v rrapad i'v A~ev w o utL7drwtv, vol. 14.582-98 Kfihn; references by the page and line number of the edition of Gabler (Diss., Rostock, 1903) and the 
page number of S. Ebbesen's edition (Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici 
Elenchi (3 vols., Leiden, 1981), ii. Iff.). The Stoic classification is at ch. 4, 12.10ff. G, 21-5 E. The 
'more sophisticated Stoics' are mentioned at 12.18 G 21E. Theon's wording at 81.30-1 might 
lead one initially to believe that the only sort of dtpofloALa isolated by the dialecticians is that 
7rapa i -v KOLVwv, and that therefore the rest of the classification is Theon's own, or is drawn 
from some other source; but the closeness of the resemblance between this list and the one 
reported by Galen rules out either possibility - Theon's clumsiness of expression is simply 
misleading. For a full discussion of both classifications, see my The Stoics on Ambiguity 
(Cambridge, forthcoming). 
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first alternative is the presence of Hyperbaton and Interpolation (fETa6vAoy•'a, 
82.19-25). Interpolation is something of an oddity, and I will come back to it in a 
moment. But Hyperbaton is familiar enough. It crops up in most rhetorical 
handbooks, usually as a figure, sometimes as a trope. Typically it has two forms, 
dvaarpo-q or reversio, which occurs when the normal order of two words is reversed, 
as in 'mecum' or 'secum' or 'quibus de rebus'; and hyperbaton proper, when normal 
word-order is more disturbed. Both sorts are praised by Quintilian and by the author 
of the ad Herennium as attractive, especially as helping achieve good prose rhythm. 
Hyperbaton gets its chief listing in Quintilian's classification of tropes, but he does 
mention 'excessive and confused hyperbata' as one of the sources of obscurity, when 
words are transposed too far from their natural position (Quintilian: 8.6.62ff., 
2.14-15; ad Her. 4.44). 
Yet this cannot have been the Stoic policy. What Theon is reporting is a list of types 
of ambiguity, and by no stretch of the imagination could Hyperbaton be classed tout 
court as a mode of equivocation. In fact Theon does at once come out and say that 
Hyperbaton is acceptable so long at it is not confused or overused. Instead he advises 
that 'one must take care too not to use hyperbata, of which Thucydides uses a good 
many; for we do not disapprove of the genus of hyperbaton altogether, for as a result 
of it expression becomes varied and not colloquial' (82.19-23). Theon is plainly 
correcting himself, belatedly qualifying an initial sweeping injunction. Compare his 
comment on digressions in narrative: 'One must avoid too inserting lengthy 
digressions in the middle of a narrative' (80.27-8). Here the fact that only a limited 
restriction is being advised is perfectly clear: the important adjective JtaKpds~, 
'lengthy', occupies a prominent position at the end of the sentence (an example of 
Hyperbaton, incidentally), and is not hived off into a separate clause, as Theon's 
qualification is in the case of Hyperbaton. Theon has realised, too late, that what he 
is advising his readers to instruct their young charges is hardly rhetorical orthodoxy, 
and not to his taste at all: he would know Hyperbaton primarily as a trope or a figure, 
a valued weapon in the orator's stylistic armoury. It is noteworthy that only here in 
the classification are first-person verbs employed, though Theon uses them quite 
freely elsewhere (e.g. 59.18ff. (in the introduction), 83.18ff. (in the treatment of 
conciseness in narrative)). 
There are other peculiarities. The reference to Thucydides' notorious penchant for 
hyperbata is of course too commonplace for its authorship to be settled on purely 
internal grounds (cf. e.g. 'Longinus', On the sublime 22.3; for examples used by 
rhetoricians, see e.g. R.G. 2.438.15ff.; 3.38.13-14, 17ff., 136.19-20 Sp.); but one looks 
in vain elsewhere in the Stoic classification for the sort of stylistic advice Theon 
appends to his description of Hyperbaton. His account of Interpolation is strikingly 
similar in form and theme. Theon states: '(One must be careful) not (to use) 
interpolations either, that is, lengthy ones (Kal raT'Tra 8t6d aKpo13); for quick 
resumption of the account does no injury to one's listeners' (81.23-5). Once again, an 
initial blanket ban is partially lifted. The term ftEraevAoyt'a is extremely rare in 
rhetorical texts, which is perhaps significant in itself. It appears only in a pair of the 
numerous definitions of Hyperbaton, being applied either to the reversal of the order 
of a pair of words, or to the insertion of a word between the halves of a compound 
(R.G. 3.170.14-17; 188.5ff.; these two rhetoricians seem not to have distinguished 
dvaarpoWrj from Hyperbaton proper). The rule in the rhetorical textbooks is to list 
all insertions, whether of a word or of groups of words, or of complete sentences, as 
one species of the genus Hyberbaton, and not as a distinct figure or trope (so for 
example R.G. 2.438.1ff.- indeed Hermogenes neglects all hyperbata save insertions; 
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3.38.16ff., 74.19-22, 136.21ff. Sp.). There is also a broad distinction between 
Hyperbaton in a single word (division and interruption of a compound, transposition 
of a single term) and in a word-complex (Adyos), where any disturbance of the usual 
order seems to count as Hyperbaton (e.g. R.G. 3.48.5ff., 197.20ff. Sp.). I have 
mentioned both insertions and disturbances of structure as it is not clear where the 
Stoics' Hyperbaton ends and their Interpolation begins. What is undoubtedly 
unusual is listing them separately. In the rhetoricians the tendency is rather to list 
Hyperbaton proper and Jdvauapofr4 separately: so 3.48.5ff., 18-20, 197.20-28, 
10-18 Sp. Theon's Stoics might be distinguishing between, on the one hand, changes 
in the word-order of a single linguistic group, and, on the other, the insertion of 
extraneous material into an otherwise unaltered sentence. This tends to confirm that 
tLETa~vAoyL'a in this context is an authentically Stoic term. 
The treatment of the next item in Theon's list, Elleipsis, is very brief (82.25-6), and 
evidence from elsewhere in the progymnasmata tends to suggest that Theon's 
dialecticians did not accept Elleipsis - omission of some word or words - as an 
ambiguity mode at all.55 Further, Theon does not say or imply that any of these three 
items causes ambiguity (Elleipsis is simply said to be 7rp's 7,rv (acra vELav, 82.25-6), 
as he does for all the other items in his list, and he does not illustrate them, though 
examples are offered of all the other kinds. After Elleipsis, Theon appears to return 
to the Stoic classification of ambiguity types, for the item which comes last in his 
classification is last in Galen's too, and it is very fully described (82.26-83.13). 
What seems to have happened is that Theon has wrongly inserted into the list of 
ambiguity types at least two and perhaps three items which simply do not belong here. 
He realise his error, and tries to undo the damage. Other features of the list very 
strongly suggest Theon has been tampering with his source, and as Theon is no 
scholar or doxographer, accuracy and fidelity are not in any case going to be his prime 
concern."5 The obvious source for these extraneous items is the Stoic list of causes of 
obscurity from which the classification of ambiguity kinds was itself taken. No school 
rhetorician would list Hyperbaton and Interpolation under 'obscurity': but a Stoic 
rhetorician might. He could argue that any disturbance of normal word-order (and 
I take it that the Stoa, like all ancient theorists of style, assumed that there is such a 
thing, just as they assumed that there is such a thing as a normal vocabulary) would 
only interfere with ordinary language expectations regarding word-order and syntax, 
and thus serve to draw an audience's attention away from a speaker's meaning. He 
might also observe, as the author of the treatise On the sublime does in the case of 
Demosthenes, that Hyperbaton can create emotional tension in an audience by 
55 'Obscurity in word-complexes' is said to occur 'when what is said can be understood in 
several ways, nothing being either added or taken away' (76.24-6). But what Theon is offering 
here is almost certainly a definition of ambiguity. His brief list here of cases of obscurity in single 
terms obviously anticipates the longer and more detailed classification at 81.6ff., immediately 
before the dialecticians' classification of ambiguity types. Theon is surely calling on the same 
sources for both his treatments of the topic of linguistic obscurity. If so, the 'obscurity in word- 
complexes' he describes will in fact be a condensed version of the dialecticians' ambiguity: 
Theon has simply failed to note that they are classifiying equivocation in particular, not 
obscurity in general. And in that case the dialecticians' ambiguity will by definition have 
excluded Elleipsis. 
56 Theon's clumsy introduction to the classification has already been observed (n. 54). Most 
revealing, perhaps, is Theon's account of the last equivocation type (82.26ff.), which is 
significantly dissimilar from the certainly genuine description of this kind in Galen, and may 
very well not merely reflect differences in the original (though admittedly that could well be the 
case with some other discrepancies between the two sources). 
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interrupting syntax until the resolution when meaning and structure finally become 
clear (22.3-4) - but, unlike 'Longinus', he would note this fact only with disapproval. 
Such a position is surely pretty well untenable in practice. A varied word order can 
be genuinely in the interests of clarity, above all by allowing emphasis on important 
words or phrases, and by catching and holding a listener's or a reader's attention. 
Hermogenes goes so far as to call Hyperbaton an 'instrument of clarity', 6pyavov r'i 
cra~rlvaELa for it allows the speaker or writer to insert into a sentence the explanation 
he wants to offer for, say, an event or a sequence of events (R.G. 2.438.1ff. Sp., 
especially 7-8).57 Quintilian remarks of figures of one sort: 'adeo sunt virtutes 
orationis ut sine iis nulla intellegi fere possit oratio' (9.2.2). The usefulness of tropes 
and of figures of speech and of thought, when properly applied, seems undeniable. 
Cicero's Crassus describes a wide variety of figures and warmly praises their 
effectiveness in speech (3.202ff.; cf. orator 134ff.). Personification, for example, is 
often lauded by the professionals for its attention-grabbing brevity. Perhaps the 
Stoics behind the stylistic theory which Diogenes records were more flexible in their 
approach. In particular, figured discourse might be justified precisely as a vehicle of 
clarity and as lifting one's speech above the level of the vulgar or colloquial; or might 
be accepted as a concession to clarity, given ordinary human weakness and lack of 
imagination: Seneca (ep. 59.6) writes: 'illi qui simpliciter et demonstrandae rei causa 
eloquebantur parabolis referti sunt, quas existimo necessarias, non ex eadem causa 
qua poetis, sed ut imbecillitatis nostrae adminicula sint, ut et dicentem et audientem 
in rem praesentem adducant.'58 
Chrysippus himself is said to have used rhetorical stylistic devices, and in particular 
a variety of figures of thought. Fronto complains to Marcus Aurelius that from the 
point of view of acquiring a good style he (Marcus) is reading all the wrong authors. 
He is preferring to learn to swim like a frog rather than like a dolphin: for he is 
reading Diodorus and Alexinus when he should be reading Plato, Xenophon, and 
Antisthenes. Fronto supports his admonition by describing Chrysippus' own prose 
style. The exact meaning of some of Fronto's jargon is unclear, and it does not appear 
to correspond perfectly with the Greek translations he appends to the list of Latin 
terms, but the gist is plain enough: 'Sit up and pay attention to what Chrysippus 
himself wants. Is he happy to teach, to point out a thing, define, explain? He is not: 
instead he magnifies it as far as possible, exaggerates, anticipates objections, repeats, 
digresses, recurs, asks questions, describes, makes divisions, personifies, adapts his 
language to another character...Do you not see how he handles practically all the 
orator's weapons?'59 
"5 Olympiodorus uses the term 'interpolation' where, in one instance, the parenthesis 
contains an explanation of what Aristotle is saying, in another, an illustration of it: in meteor. 
41.23ff., 204.18ff. and 24ff. 
58 Elsewhere Seneca expresses a dislike of long and complex sentence-structures (ep. 114.16). 
But it would be rash to employ Seneca straightforwardly either as an authority for or as an 
example of approved Stoic style. On the one hand, he can be starkly critical of Stoic style; on 
the other, the question of the sources for Seneca's style is a vexed and complicated one. It is 
rather a matter of saying that such-and-such a piece of Senecan writing or Senecan stylistics 
betrays signs of Stoic influence. His criticisms of the Stoa sometimes remind the reader forcefully 
of Cicero's strictures on the same subject: references in Griffin op. cit. (n. 37), p. 15, n. 1, who 
also has an informative survey of possible models for Seneca's own style (13ff.). " Fronto, ad M. Antoninum Imp. de eloquentiae liber II, ed. Hout (vol. 1, Brill, 1954), 
??16-17, pp. 139-40 (= (part) SVF 2.27). The figures of thought in question seem to be: 
anticipation (prolepsis), question (interrogatio), personification (prosopopoeia), mimicry 
(ethopoeia), and perhaps vivid description (evidentia). Amplification is not so much a figure as 
a generic term for what figures enable the speaker to do: so e.g. Cicero, de or. 3.104ff.- 
Chrysippus was in fact notoriously prolix: Diogenes 7.180, SVF 2.27, 883. 
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So little remains of the Chrysippean corpus that it is impossible to check Fronto's 
assertion with any confidence. The extant book of Logical Questions (AoyLKG 
Zrp-4tarTa) may very well not be a typical work,60 though a detailed stylistic analysis 
of, say, the quite extensive remains of the central and far better known de anima 
would be useful."6 Fronto's application of standard rhetorical jargon could be 
inappropriate and distortive; what counts as a specifically rhetorical device is 
theoretically determined (one ancient theory of language actually labelled all figures 
of thought, and perhaps of speech too, as fictions)." At all events Fronto has 
provided an invaluable reminder: the stylistic qualities in question are excellences, not 
essentials. Together they constitute a model, an ideal standard of discourse. How 
Chrysippus actually wrote (or is perceived to have written) is not to the point. 
The main evidence for Stoic style in theory and practice has been assembled and 
examined; we can now return to the origins of Stoic stylistics, and draw up a final 
assessment of its eccentricity. The Stoics, as I observed much earlier, probably took 
over and adapted a doctrine of the virtues of language from the Peripatetic 
Theophrastus (cf. Cicero, orator 79-80): but there the debt ends. Simplicius reports 
that Theophrastus in his On the elements of speech 'set in motion' the disciplines, 
rrpayLaTEL'at, that concern AE~ELS qua AE~eLs, rather than qua significant, which is 
Aristotle's subject-matter in the Categories (cat. 10.24ff. = fr. A.VI. 1 (c), p. 15 
Maier). These 'disciplines' cover, inter alia, the distinction between strict and 
metaphorical expression, and what its qualities (18saL) are, 'what is "clarity" in 
expressions (AE'htj), what "elevation", what "pleasing" and "persuasive"' (10.30- 
11.1). (Unfortunately it is unclear how much of what Simplicius reports is 
authentically Theophrastean.) This apparent interest in the entire realm of discourse 
might perhaps be thought characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy before (to put the 
matter crudely) the professional rhetoricians and grammarians had pretty well carved 
linguistic studies up between them, leaving only the semantic crumbs to the 
philosopher. Another important fragment puts paid to that idea: 'As the orientation 
(aXE'LS) of language (Adyos) is two-fold, both toward the hearers (to whom it also 
signifies something) and toward objects 
(rpdytarTa), 
poetics and rhetoric are 
concerned with its orientation toward the audience...but the philosopher will 
primarily be interested in language's orientation toward objects, refuting what is false 
and demonstrating what is true' (fr. A.VI.1(b), pp. 14-15 Maier (with omissions), fr. 
65 Wimmer, fr. 24 Schmidt). As a comparison with Aristotle's Rhetoric will show, 
Theophrastus has here formalised and schematised the teaching of his master, just as 
he does the Aristotelian doctrine of the stylistic virtues. 
Aristotle's attitude to rhetoric is a curious mixture of contempt and sophistication. 
He is firm that the whole business of rhetoric is irphs 8dav ('directed toward 
appearance', or perhaps 'reputation': cf. Plato, Apology 35b9). It is 8S'Kaov to look 
for nothing in a speech JqaE 
aj'7E 
t 'E AviIrEV j'T' Ebpat'vEv, and to fight one's case 
only abrofg...roi9 7rpdytLaaLv, WGTE TaAAa E'w 70o' drros7T0 aL 7rEplEpya •criv. The 
60 The fragments of a book of this work are preserved as PHerc 307. It seems to be a more 
or less random collection of problems in dialectic (so D. N. Sedley, 'The Negated Conjunction 
in Stoicism', Elenchus 5 (1984), 311ff., at 314: 'The Logical Questions appears to consist in a 
series of aporetic problems in logic without any attempt at definitive solutions'). Form, content, 
and style all suggest that it may have been little more than a private notebook. (See my 
unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 'The Stoics on Ambiguity', pp. 203ff.). 
61 Galen's de placitis Platonis et Hippocratis (ed. P. De Lacy, 2nd. ed. with tr. and 
commentary, Berlin, 1981) preserves considerable fragments of these works; those of the de 
anima were assembled by von Arnim in what he believed to be their original order at SVF 2.911 ; 
those of the On the passions are collected at 3.461ff. 62 Cf. R.G. 3.11.18ff. Sp. 
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a Ov oUSELs' oOUTw YEWtLETPEL-V SL&LUKEL (3.1, 
1404alff.). In an oration language must be made exotic or unusual, 66r-q: OavtaaTral 
ydp awv 
' 
dd'vrWv EloSV, &S i- O 0avaurdv 0art  (3.2, 1404b10ff.). The key is to 
appear to be natural, while not being so (18-20). Success means that 
aF-at 
-raL EVLKOV 
Ka' AavOav ,v Ev&6ETaL Kal aa0qL7vLE, aUT7 " 7V 77 TOU p•opLKOo AdyOU p7ov 7 
(35-7). 
Aristotle identifies one complex excellence of (rhetorical and poetical) language: 
cpLuOw AE`EWSg PE'T7)a a9 EL VaL (atLEEov Y7dp L Ao'yo c'jv, I&v 8&AoL ot) 
7TL77UEL To aUEVOi PYOV), Kai 1L 7q7TE Ta7TELV17V 7)TE 7TVEP To cL aLa, caL 7peovaav 
(3.2.1404bl-4; 3.5 offers instead a complex 'principle' of language comprising 
elements of clarity and purity, but the differences between the two treatments are not 
important here). It is this which Theophrastus has analysed into the familiar four 
dpETraL, a small initial contribution to that peculiar rigidity - over-subtlety combined 
with insensitivity - which infects much of ancient stylistics. Like the Stoa, 
Theophrastus seems to have intended good discourse to have all four excellences, just 
as Aristotle's unitary pET-? characterises all good language, even though poetic and 
rhetorical discourse meet its criteria in importantly different ways. But what Aristotle 
saw as the inherent deficiency of rhetorical discourse - its audience-dependency, its 
need to please and not merely inform, its low emotionalism - has apparently been 
accepted, and its irreconcilable incompatibility with the language of the philosopher 
and the scientist has been reduced to the anodyne status of a mere diferentia. 
Theophrastus has altered, not merely developed, Aristotle's teaching, apparently 
an unusual step for him in this field."3 If early Stoics knew of Aristotle's work in the 
field, though, they wanted no truck with it either. It is not merely that they prescribed 
more than clarity for philosophical (indeed any) discourse: rather they refused to 
acknowledge any important distinction at all between the discourse of the philosophy 
school and that of the lawcourt or assembly. It is not surprising that they also entirely 
failed to absorb the conventional distinctions described earlier between various types 
of oration and between styles of discourse within orations. 
We have seen some of the large and perhaps insoluble difficulties posed by the 
details of Stoic stylistics. Two features of the broader picture also refuse to fall 
altogether happily into place. 
So far I have been concentrating on Stoic rhetoric as the province of the wise man, 
as a science. It is a well-attested Stoic tenet that the sage is the one true orator, and 
that rhetoric is a science and a virtue (cf. p. 406 above). Yet we have Plutarch's evi- 
dence that Chrysippus defined rhetoric as a ?rTEXV or 'expertise' of some sort (St. rep. 
1047A).6 Now Plutarch's sole interest is in convicting Chrysippus of inconsistency 
- despite his detailed treatment of delivery, Chrysippus affirms later in the very same 
work that such things as hiatus are to be ignored, and so too are 'certain unclarities 
and omissions and solecisms' (1047B) - and not in unbiased reportage of 
63 For a survey of Theophrastus' debt to Aristotle in matters of diction, delivery, and almost 
certainly style as well, see Innes, art. cit. (n. 7). 
64 Unfortunately the text is problematic; the most plausible reconstruction has Chrysippus 




'order and arrangement 
of continuous discourse'. (In passing I would point to a possible connection with Gorgias 504b.) 
The phrase 'continuous discourse' (if it is authentic) recalls both the AdyoL iv LE6d0wo of 
Diogenes 7.42 and the Stoic definition of rhetoric preserved by Sextus (M. 2.6). The description 
itself seems at once too vague and too restrictive: not sufficiently technical, yet excluding such 
matters as vocal modulation, gestures, and facial expressions, which Plutarch asserts Chrysippus 
did indeed discuss. 
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Chrysippus' views on rhetoric. But on this occasion at least Chrysippus does seem to 
have made rhetoric an expertise, and Diogenes of Babylon appears to have referred 
to it as one of a number of expertises (Philodemus rh. 2.211.9ff. S. = SVF 3.11.117). 
Chrysippus' own On rhetoric is listed in the bibliography partially extant in Diogenes 
under a subsection of ethical works which are concered with 'common reason [i.e. 
rationality common to men and gods], and the skills and virtues constructed from it' 
(7.201-2 = SVF 2.17, p. 9.20ff.). Quintilian (2.17.2) asserts that 'the Stoics and 
Peripatetics agree for the most part that rhetoric is an ars'. Further - and this is the 
second reason for puzzling over the Plutarch passage cited earlier - one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of an expertise appears to be that it has an end or 
'r-AoS (finis), which sciences lack.65 But the extensive literature expounding and rebutting 
(mostly New Academic) criticisms of rhetoric's widely-contested pretensions to the 
status of an expertise - and one of the chief points made against rhetoric was that it 
has no definite 'end' - never adverts to what would surely be a remarkably 
unorthodox position: that the expertise which is Stoic rhetoric has no 'end'.66 If 
Stoic rhetoric really is an expertise, it should by definition have an 'end'. Why, then, 
is there no record of it, when so much material on the topic has survived? 
The question is not a trivial one, for two reasons. First, although expertises and 
sciences are similar in that they are both bodies of organised knowledge, in the form 
of systematically-arranged 'theorems', sciences, unlike expertises, are the sole 
province of the wise. Rhetoric qua science is a virtue, and virtues, again unlike 
expertises, do not admit of degrees (SVF 2.393): everyone can be more or less 
proficient at an expertise, but every sage is as good and virtuous and knowledgeable 
as every other. Sextus (M. 2.6) reports explicitly that although the Stoa and the 
Academic Xenocrates appear to share a definition of rhetoric, 'the science of speaking 
well', Xenocrates simply meant 'the expertise of speaking well' but the Stoics 
conceived of science as 'the holding of firm apprehensions, and naturally present only 
in the sage' (on science being the province of the wise, see also M. 7.150ff.). If the Stoa 
conventionally defined rhetoric as some sort of expertise, one would expect Sextus, 
with access to (inter alia) a whole array of New Academic arguments against 
rhetoric's technical pretensions, to know about it.67 
"6 Zeno's definition of 'expertise', 'a system of apprehensions organised together to some 
useful end in life' (SVF 1.73), became standard in many later texts (e.g. Sextus, M. 2.10; SVF 
2.93, 94, 95). Chrysippus' and Cleanthes' definitions (Olympiodorus in Gorg. 12, pp. 69.26-70.3 
Westerink) are similar. Definitions of' science' stress its stability and unchangeability, but never 
mention an 'end': Sextus, M. 7.151; Diogenes 7.47; SVF 2.117. Stoic sapientia is not like 'the 
other expertises' because its end lies in activity, as with dancing or acting (de fin. 3.24-5); but 
this only confirms that expertises all have some sort of end. The sage is said to have an 'expertise 
of life' (e.g. Sextus, M. 11.199), but this synoptic expertise will not be on all fours with ordinary- 
range expertises, which each comprise a narrow set of theorems directed to a particular goal 
within the context of life as a whole. 
66 The most comprehensive survey of arguments against rhetoric's technical status (strictly, 
against its existence) is Sextus, M. 2; Quintilian presents and attempts to refute a fair selection 
at 2.15ff. and 12.1ff. For a favourable review of Sextus' criticisms, see J. Barnes, 'Is Rhetoric an 
Art?', DARG newsletter 2/2 (Fall 1986), 2ff. 
7 Sextus, M. 2.48-59 sets out to prove that rhetoric has no subject-matter, 3A-9. At 56-7 
Sextus gives three grounds on which the orator might be said to frame 'fine language', all of 
which he goes on to reject; the second and third together almost cover the area of the Stoic 
stylistic virtues (appropriateness alone is missing). Sextus concludes that 'therefore rhetoric's job 
is not to produce fine language and speaking well (ro6 E AE•yELv)' (58). One might at first glance 
think this a poor sort of argument against Stoic rhetoric; but Sextus might well regard it as a 
good tactic to attack the Stoa for paying even the feeblest attention to matters of style, and for 
restricting their 'speaking well' by any stylistic criteria at all. If this is Sextus' main individual 
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This whole issue has fundamental consequences for how we conceive of Stoic 
rhetoric. In the hands of the wise expertises may become 'quasi-virtues' (SVF 3.111, 
cf. 294, 562), but the evidence describing rhetoric as a virtue is not in the least 
provisional. Given the differentia between expertise and science already described, it 
would be a plainly inadequate response that a science is actually a species of expertise: 
the same system of rhetorical theorems could not be both an expertise and a science. 
The usual Stoic definition of an expertise, attributed to Zeno, describes the end simply 
as 'useful in life', and says nothing about its moral nature; something similar seems 
to be implied by Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' definitions. Rhetoric strictly conceived 
cannot be an expertise because of the contradiction between the morally neutral 
conception of expertise and the morally loaded duty of participating correctly in 
politics; but the rhetoric which is an expertise can be made (more) morally acceptable 
by being made to share as many theorems as possible with oratory-as-science.6" The 
orator-sage will thus function as an ideal for conduct in the public arena, and his 
rhetorical knowledge as a paradigm for the expertise which all can exercise. I have 
chosen to concentrate on rhetoric as a science and a virtue, but the other, technical, 
rhetoric must not be ignored, especially as it may perhaps represent the Stoa's attempt 
to provide practical guidelines to the would-be Stoic orator, who knows he is not a 
sage but none the less wishes to conduct his public and political life on Stoic lines. On 
the other hand, the difficulty is not to be glossed over. If rhetoric is a science and a 
virtue, it is in one important sense removed from the public realm, a strange fate for 
the science of formal public discourse: if it is a mere expertise, the orator seems to lose 
his infallibility and invincible authority.69 
That Chrysippus at least believed that allowances could be made for unintentional 
failure to achieve correct rhetorical style is suggsted by the passage in Plutarch 
already cited. Two stylistic features which professional rhetoricians thought the sine 
qua non of good style, and which, as we saw (p. 410) were sometimes dubbed the 
criticism of Stoic rhetoric, it could confirm that it did not have an 'end', and in particular that 
the Stoa did not associate rhetoric with the goal of persuasion. It is unclear to me whether 
Chrysippus' definition can be usefully linked with a passage from Sextus (M. 2.43), where 
'certain people' are reported as holding that there are two sorts of rhetoric, one for the wise, one 
for 'middling' or 'intermediate men' (iv /Eaogt dvOp&crro~o). I do not see how /uEaos 
could be 
used by a Stoic as co-extensional with 'ordinary, non-wise': for it typically designates actions 
just insofar as they are performable by wise and non-wise alike, not such actions as performable 
or actually performed by just one of those jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups. 
68 Quintilian's formulation of the 'end' of rhetoric adopts what was originally probably a 
Stoic scheme, but I doubt that his application is itself Stoic. Quintilian distinguishes between the 
'end' of rhetoric, 'speaking well', and persuasion, which is only a desired consequence, the 
UKr7TOc (2.17.23). This does not seem to conform to the authentic Stoic end/UKOTros 
scheme: 
contrast esp. SVF 3.16, Plutarch, comm. not. 1070f, Cicero, defin 3.22. On the whole issue, see 
R. Alpers-Gotz, Der Begriffe UKOr7Tos in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (Hildesheim, 1976). 
69 Of course the sage is not infallible in any straightforward sense. It is significant that 
Chrysippus' formulation of the 'end' of life is 'living in accordance with experience of what 
happens by nature' (e.g. Diogenes 7.87). Even the wise cannot always predict what is fated to 
happen, and thus direct their choices accordingly (cf. Inwood, op. cit. (n. 31), 203ff.); hence they 
too will sometimes assent to its being merely 'reasonable', EtiAoyov, that such-and-such will be 
the case, and their infallibility actually lies in never failing, where circumstances require it, to 
preface the propositions to which they assent with this 'operator'. Similar allowances may 
perhaps be built into expertises and sciences alike: some at least of their theorems will be 
guidelines, not substantive and invariable laws. Augustine (SVF 2.106) reports that the Stoics 
defined dialectic as the sollertia disputandi which, like Diogenes 7.48, confirms that it necessarily 
has an experiential element. Rhetoric might be subject to the same sort of limitations: for 
example, the sage cannot be sure, only be sure it is reasonable to expect, that this speech will be 
clear to this audience. But this provision does not help fix the distinction between rhetoric as 
expertise and as science. 
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essential virtues of style, Hellenism and clarity - the first two entries in the Stoic 
list - were it seems not thought essential by Chrysippus. As we noted, he advised 
disregarding not only hiatus but also 'certain obscurities and omissions and by 
Heaven solecisms'. (Chrysippus himself was criticised by Galen for solecising: SVF 
2.24. 894, p. 245.3ff., cf. inst. log. ch. 4.6.) Chrysippus obscurely advises the policy 
instead of 'holding fast to what is better'. His unorthodoxy might spring from the 
conviction that traditionally embarrassing signs of a poor education, such as 
intermittent lapses of attention to euphony and lucidity, are less serious errors than 
are the telling lapses of taste, into purple prose or Gorgianic figures, which betray 
incorrect moral standards. Chrysippus is asking indulgence for the inept or 
inexperienced but well-intentioned speaker: if his motives are good, some deficiences 
are excusable and relatively unimportant. 
Quintilian's rhetorical education (like Cicero's) is directed to the formation of an 
ideal orator, the 'Romanum quemdam sapientem' (12.2.6-7) who undoubtedly has 
some Stoic blood in his veins; but Quintilian seems to distance himself consciously 
from the Stoic model,70 while his appeals to support from the Stoa only on a few 
disputed points suggest independence elsewhere. 
One of the chief areas where Quintilian feels the need for Stoic backing is in his 
defence of the concessions that the orator - who for Quintilian too must be a vir 
bonus - will where necessary tell falsehoods and arouse the emotions of his audience 
(2.17.18ff.; 12.1.36ff.). The permissible falsehood is undoubtedly a Stoic principle, the 
justification for which has come down, in a rather garbled form, both in Quintilian 
(12.1.38-9) and in Sextus (M. 7.42-5). Falsehood is acceptable given both that the 
speaker knows that what he is saying is false, and that he has a good 8tdOEati, a 
condition which the sage alone can meet. Quintilian's reply to the charges mentioned 
is worth quoting: 'Neither of these things is disgraceful (turpe) when it has its origin 
in a good ratio, and for that reason not a vice either. For it is permitted even to the 
sage sometimes to say a falsehood, and the orator will of necessity move the judge's 
feelings if he cannot otherwise be led to justice.' When summarising the philosophers' 
opposition to emotional appeals in perorations, Quintilian observes: 'I am less 
surprised at the philosophers, for whom it is practically a vice to be emotionally 
moved; nor is it a sign of good character, if the judge is distracted from the truth in 
this way, nor is it appropriate for a good man to exploit vices. Yet they will admit that 
emotions are necessary, if truth and justice and the common interest cannot otherwise 
be secured' (6.1.7) (cf. pp. 404-5). 
Quintilian would of course be wrong to attribute to the Stoa the view that emotions 
simpliciter are close to vice: it is the rdTOq which play that r6le, the excessive impulses 
uncontrolled by reason or warped and corrupt judgements which lead to wretchedness 
and vice; vice itself is inconsistency and disharmony in the whole conduct of life (cf. 
e.g. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.29; SVF 3.378, 462).7' The Quintilian passage is interesting 
because it confirms both that it is normally wrong to stir others' passions (for the issue 
70 Quintilian may perhaps be reacting to the quietist movement in Stoicism that received a 
hostile response from Cicero and Seneca, and perhaps Panaetius. See further nn. 37, 42. 
71 In describing the passions as weak and corrupt judgements I am of course following the 
Chrysippean moral psychology. A Chrysippean orator would see part of his task as extirpating 
excessive impulses and irrational judgements (the passions), and his (justified) appeals to the 
passions as incitements to (bad and vicious) judgements, whereas a Posidonian would rather call 
for the passions to be controlled by the rational part of the soul, or, in the special case under 
consideration, urge them against the dictates of reason. But the appeals to reason and the strict 
demands of morality would remain substantively the same; and it is therefore I think doubtful 
that this theoretical difference would show itself in the style of rhetoric. 
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is not whether the speaker is moved, but whether he will move his audience) and that 
the sage's perfectly virtuous disposition frees him from that prohibition. (It is 
illuminating to contrast Antony's boast that he never feigned emotion in court, and his 
demand that the orator should always be sincere: de or. 2.189.) The wise man uses 
'crooked' emotional appeals which are otherwise forbidden in order to bring the jury 
back to 'the straight and narrow' (for the image, see Quintilian 2.17.29: 'recta 
via...alio flexu'); perhaps this explains a curious passage in Plutarch where 
Chrysippus is reported to have said that 'the sage will speak in public and take part 
in politics as if wealth were really a good and reputation and health likewise' (St. rep. 
1034B). Presumably - though Quintilian does not say so - he will use appropriate 
emotional language, for it is no use merely mouthing the words 'I appeal to your pity' 
or 'I wish to arouse your anger'. 
It is one of the less palatable Stoic doctrines that the sage will gull and manipulate 
his audience as adults deceive little children (the analogy is from Quintilian, 12.1.38, 
but its context suggests it is Stoic), and that this particular concession to human 
weakness, to ordinary but morally unacceptable motivation, should have been made 
at all. Of course the wise do not actually deceive: common people consent out of 
weakness to the false impressions he presents (Plutarch, St. rep. 1055F ff., esp. 
1055F-1056A, 1057B), and the sage does not lie or deceive (SVF 3. 567). Strictly, then, 
I assume, he cannot be said to persuade either, if persuasion is actually inducing 
assent, for the sage only presents his hearers with impressions: sometimes they are 
merely plausible, sometimes they are true and reliable: but assent to them is always 
in the audience's power. And he steps uncomfortably outside the boundaries 
normally imposed on discourse by our duty to others not in using language calculated 
to move, but in presenting impressions whose emotional charge is that of a passion. 
I shall return shortly to the question of the wise man's persuasiveness. 
Ealier I tried to indicate some of the radical differences between Stoic and 
Aristotelian rhetoric and stylistics. Yet Aristotle and the Stoa were, I believe, reacting 
to a common challenge. Ideal Stoic oratory, I suggest, becomes more intelligible as 
the Stoa's partial and one-sided response to the notorious Platonic onslaught on 
oratory. Whereas Aristotle accepted the practical need for rhetoric, and in particular 
developed the psychology of persuasion sketched in the Phaedrus (271a ff.), the 
Stoa conceived of an orator who not only 'knows just things and is just' (cf. Gorgias 
459c-461c), and wants only to make his fellow-citizens as good as possible (as 
Socrates, the only politician, wants to do: 513e-514a), but at the same time has a 
style of discourse barely distinguishable from the Stoic model of philosophical 
discourse, dialectic - whose historical model is Socratic question-and-answer dia- 
lectic. 
The Stoic debt is not exhausted by such particular connections as the fact that, for 
example, Socrates' account in the Symposium (198d) of the correct procedure for 
praising anything - say what is true about it, pick out what is fairest and arrange it 
in the most becoming way - might almost be a programmatic statement for the Stoic 
encomiast, with suitable interpretations of 'fairest' and 'becoming'. The real point is 
much broader. The Stoa put a stop to the long-running competition between rhetoric 
and dialectic - a competition Plato can be fairly said to have started - not by a few 
cosmetic improvements and not by eliminating rhetoric altogether, but by simply 
cancelling the fixture: rhetoric and dialectic become two aspects of the same hand, 
open palm and clenched fist. Rhetoric keeps its own formal distinguishing 
characteristics (those lengthy speeches derided by Socrates: Gorgias 448c-d, 461e- 
462a; Protagoras 335c, 336c-d, cf. 338b-c; the public nature of rhetorical discourse 
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approved at Phaedrus 261b), but abandons its literary pretensions; keeps its necessary 
association with the wise and good man versed in philosophy (261a, 269d4 ff.; cf. 
270a, Pericles) and with the public promotion of virtue and knowledge (Gorgias 
513e-514a, Phaedrus 260d3ff., 277e-278a), but loses its hitherto inalienable 
association with persuasion (just as words spoken merely rTEOo63g VEK va are 
unacceptable, 277e). I am not supposing that this would be a scholarly and 
dispassionate reading of the relevant dialogues; and there is no evidence that early 
Stoics read and reacted to them. But I think it a real possibility that when they sought 
to rehabilitate oratory - a task imposed by the ethics of service to the community - 
it was Plato's damning criticism of oratory which they saw as the challenge, which 
they tried to meet and neutralise; and they did so by refusing to admit into their own 
ideal the very aspects of it which had initiated the war between rhetoric and 
dialectic. 
Plato's Apology may have provided the Stoa with a model, though an imperfect 
one, of the criteria by which an orator is to select his material and his language. The 
opening sentences of the work explicitly oppose plausibility to truth (17al-4), and 
the real orator always speaks the truth (b4-6). Socrates does not offer beautiful, 
cunningly crafted AdyoL (17b8-c2), but asks the judges to ignore the 'manner' of what 
he says and concentrate on deciding whether it is just or not (18a2-6). His concern 
has always been with the moral welfare of his fellow citizens (29d7-e3, cf. 30a2-4, 
36c5-dl); the weapons of conventional oratory are (ostensibly) rejected (38d2ff.) 
because 'it seems just neither to ask a favour of a judge, nor to get off by asking it, 
rather than teaching and convincing him' (35b9-cl), and Socrates disdains the usual 
courtroom histrionics (e.g. 34b7ff.). The Apology even shows one and the same 
individual delivering a continuous oration and cross-examining his accuser in a skilful 
display of dialectical tactics (24c4ff.). We should note too that Socrates' acceptance 
of fate (39b7-8, 41d3-5), his affirmation of the providence of the gods (41d2), his 
confidence that no harm can befall the good man (30c9-d 1, 41c9-d2), his wonderful 
encomium of death (40c4ff.), and his conviction that moral progress is paramount 
(28b5ff.) look as much part of Stoic orthodoxy as his denial that he is angry with his 
accusers, even though their behaviour is blameworthy (41d7-el). 
The rift between Plato's Socrates and the Stoa lies not so much in the facts that 
Socrates does, of course, indulge in more or less open emotionalism (such as the 
famous mention of his children), and that his protestations of ignorance and 
inexperience (in any case, of course, conventional orator's tricks) are belied by the 
beauty, rhetorical mastery, and emotional power of the speeches Plato gives him. 
Socrates is convinced that a good man will not long survive the enmity and hatred 
generated by political activity, and he has channelled his moral concern into one-to- 
one philosophical encounters (e.g. 31d6ff.). The Stoa has tried to provide a model of 
discourse which spans this public/private divide, for the Stoic orator does not have 
two languages, one public, the other private, one for philosophical inquiry and 
discussion, the other for the courtroom and assembly. (Socrates asks his judges to 
excuse his using in court the same sort of language as he employs in ordinary life: e.g. 
17c7-d l.) What he refuses to accept is that the possibility of moral improvment for 
his fellows has to be restricted to Socratic conversations (31 el-32a3). His oratory will 
play in public the same r6le (mutatis mutandis, of course, allowing for the Stoic moral 
code) of benefiting others as Socrates' elenctic sessions did in private - and will be just 
about as popular. 
I started with a list of some of the notorious Stoic paradoxes, and I will end with 
one of my own: Stoic rhetoric is an enormously successful failure. If by 'rhetoric' is 
16 OCQ 
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meant what the ancients usually meant by 'rhetoric'- the theoretical study of the 
content and techniques of certain modes of formal discourse directed (at least 
nominally) to effecting persuasion - then not only does the Stoic orator fail, for the 
most part, in the conventional task of persuading, trying to persuade, or finding 
persuasive material, but there is no such thing as 'Stoic rhetoric'; and discussing it 
is not possible, not (the usual excuse) because there is no evidence, but because there 
is nothing to talk about. Rather it is the science of speaking well, or correctly, and 
speaking in accordance with the stylistic virtues must surely enter into any account 
of what 'well' or 'correctly' mean in this context; and I have tried to argue that those 
virtues were chosen because they are supposed to ensure that what is said in court, 
or in the assembly or the senate, if it is approved and assented to, is assented to 
precisely because it is a good and sound argument, or a piece of true narrative or 
description, not because it sounds attractive or is presented in an amusing, novel, 
moving, or exciting way. 
In fact the outstanding peculiarity of Stoic rhetorical stylistics is that it hardly so 
much as nods at the goal of orthodox oratory. Persuasion or trying to persuade are 
not what the wise man aims for: but at the same time what is persuasive in his speech 
is only what as rational, moral agents people should find persuasive - except when, 
in our ignorance and weakness, we assent to the falsehoods and appeals to emotion 
he deploys for our own good. The sage will on occasion, as we saw, present merely 
plausible impressions, but his oratory is not directed toward or informed by the 
conventional goal of mere plausibility. This is the irreducibly alien heart of that 
strangest of virtues, Stoic rhetoric. Public discourse is a necessary part of public duty; 
so far the Stoa conforms to the ordinary conception of oratory as a vital part of the 
performance of the citizen's role, at once his burden and his privilege. But 'speaking 
well' is a matter of private success, because it is exercising a virtue, and to that extent 
is removed from the public realm and freed from public criteria of success and 
failure.72 
The remarkable thing is that there were men, Romans, who took this ideal seriously 
enough to stake their political careers on it: there can be no more striking testimony 
to the power of that ideal and no more poignant reminder of Stoic oratory's almost 
universal uselessness in practice. Rutilius Rufus, a student of Panaetius, is described 
by Velleius as 'virum non saeculi sui sed omnis aevi optimum' (2.13.2), and by Cicero 
as 'paene perfectus in Stoicis, quorum peracutum et artis plenum orationis genus scis 
tamen esse exile nec satis populari assensione accommodatum'; his style of speaking 
was 'tristi et severo' and his speeches 'ieiunae' (Brutus 113, 114). What is not to be 
scorned, though, is his devotion to virtue. Rutilius saw his duties as applying equally 
72 One might be tempted to add that the wise cannot even be said to attempt persuasion, since 
no virtue can be exercised with varying degrees of success. (Many conventional definitions of the 
goal of the orator or of oratory employ such a 'failsafe': what the orator does is, not persuade, 
but 'find persuasive material' or 'treat a political question as persuasively as possible' or the 
like: cf. e.g. Quintilian 2.15.12,13,23ff.). Failure to persuade in any given case would not be 
damning, since it may only be reasonable, ElAoyov, not fixed and predictable, that such-and- 
such a speech or certain components of it will or will not bring success in these particular 
circumstances (cf. n. 69). I think a more formidable objection to this formulation of the Stoic 
orator's goal is that introducing the notion of the 'plausible', m7ravov, would grossly distort our 
apprehension of his true purpose, benefiting others. The use of falsehood and of appeals to 
emotions - that is, of mere persuasiveness - has a limited r6le in his programme, which as a 
whole is ethically impeccable. Further, Chrysippus stresses that the sage is in no way responsible 
for our being deceived (Plutarch, St. rep. 1055E-1056A), and he surely could not be described 
as having the intention to deceive, that is, of trying to lead us to assent to what he knows to be 
false: what the sage wants is not assent, but action and impulse (1057B). 
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to the subjects of Roman rule. As legatus to Asia in 943 he earned the respect of the 
local population for defending them against the avarice of the publicani (cf. Cicero, 
ad fam. 1.9.26; pro Plancio 35), who accordingly, had him brought to trial on 
trumped-up charges of extortion (probably in 92 B.C.) and secured his condemnation 
by bribing the judges. Cicero's Antony blames Rutilius' failure to obtain an acquittal 
on his refusal to plead his case as Crassus would have done: 'non modo supplex 
iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem, aut liberius causam dici suam, quam 
simplex ratio veritatis ferebat' (de or. 1.229; cf. Brutus 114-15). He lived out an 
honourable exile in Smyrna, and died there in about 77. But none the less he was 
exiled, and there could be worse fates for the unsuccessful. It is no coincidence that 
Antony makes Rutilius' historical model no less a figure than Socrates himself, who 
also disdained rhetoric's aid.73 For students of philosophy, the Stoic orator's 
successful failure is equally poignant: for he shows us why he fails, shows us the limits 
of reason.74 
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7 So Antony, de or. 1.231, cf. Xenophon mem. 4.4.4; elsewhere (Tusc. Disp. 1.71), Cicero 
asserts that Socrates had magnitudo, greatness of mind, not superbia, haughtiness. For other 
noble Romans in the Stoic mould, see Griffin, op cit. (n. 37), 248-9. Antony's account of the trial 
is fascinating. Rutilius and his fellow-pleaders have to toe the party-line (almost literally: no 
foot-stamping permitted), or else be denounced to the Stoic authorities (de or. 1.230). The tone 
is mocking - Antony's Stoa functions an an alternative state, the implacable and authoritarian 
guardian of morality to which offenders can be 'denounced'- but would lose its bite if Stoic 
orators did not have the ideal of calm and unemotive delivery and, I would suggest, language 
as well. On Rutilius, cf. G. L. Hendrickson, 'The Memoirs' of Rutilius Rufus', 
Classical Philology 28 (1933), 153-75. 
" A version of this paper was read at the meeting of the Southern Association for Ancient 
Philosophy in September 1987, and I am grateful to the participants for their comments on that 
occasion. I would also like to thank Jonathan Barnes and Donald Russell for their constructive 
written comments, and Michael Frede and the Editors for many invaluable suggestions and 
criticisms. 
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